July 2016 - Parks & Recreation - 30

L AW R E V I E W

newah School District (school district) conveyed the park to the city in fee simple for
consideration of $10. The park was deeded
shortly after both parties entered into a formal agreement to " develop outdoor recreational facilities for general public outdoor
recreation use " as outlined in the parties'
Joint Service Agreement (JSA). Both parties assume as fact that School Park was
transferred to the city in 1976 for the sole
purpose of obtaining a federal grant for
improvements, which were not available if
the school district continued to own it. As a
result of this transaction, the city was able
to obtain a federal grant from the Land
and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) to
make general improvements to the park for
public use and enjoyment.
Pursuant to the JSA, the city agreed
to construct joint facilities in the park
for public use in conjunction with school
activities, and the school district agreed
to maintain the facilities. Although the
school district pays for all maintenance,
water and electric utilities, has made significant improvements to the facilities,
maintains property insurance for those
improvements and controls the scheduling for organized events, the park is generally open to the public at no expense. In
this particular instance, Hayes did not pay
any fee or admission to enter the park.
Hayes filed a premises liability claim
against the city for his injuries. In turn, the
city filed a motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the city was entitled to a
limit on liability under Idaho's RUS. The
district (i.e., trial) court agreed with the
city. In the opinion of the district court,
Idaho's RUS, Idaho Code section 361604, provided the city of Plummer with
immunity because the city did not receive
" compensation " or " charge " for use of
the land upon which Hayes was injured.
The district court, therefore, granted the
city's motion for summary judgment, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. Hayes appealed to the state supreme court.
28	 Parks & Recreation

Fee for Services Rendered?
As described by the state supreme court,
the specific issue to be resolved on appeal
was " whether the school district's payment of utilities and property insurance,
maintenance, improvements to the facilities and control of the park's activities
schedule constitutes 'compensation' that
the city 'charged' to the school district in
exchange for the use of the park. "
As noted by the court, " the objective of
statutory interpretation is to derive the intent
of the legislative body that adopted the act. "
Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute and
provisions should not be read in isolation,
but must be interpreted in the context of
the entire document. Words should be
given their plain, usual and ordinary
meanings and only if the language is
ambiguous may this court consider rules
of statutory construction.
Citing the dictionary definitions, the
court found the plain, usual and ordinary definitions of " charge " and compensation " were as follows:
'Charge' is ordinarily defined as 'to
demand a fee; to bill.' - Black's Law
Dictionary p. 282 (10th ed., 2014).
'Compensation " 'is defined as 'remuneration and other benefits received in return
for services rendered.' Black's Law Dictionary p. 342-43 (10th ed., 2014)
Accordingly, the state supreme court
found a plain reading of these terms within the context of the state RUS " unambiguously demonstrates that the terms
'charge' and 'compensation' only reflect
payment for direct use or admission to
the property. " In so doing, the court noted
that the " compensation exception " under
a state RUS generally is only applicable
" where a landowner received monetary
payment specifically for the public's entrance or enjoyment of a recreational
area. " Specifically, the fee exception to
immunity under an otherwise applicable
state RUS usually requires a " charge " as

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" consideration given in return for the express and direct privilege of being allowed
to utilize the property, in money or other
thing of value. " In this particular instance,
the court found " Hayes entered the park
at no expense whatsoever...[and no] assertion has ever been made that either
the school district or the city benefited by
Hayes's access to the park in any way. "
That being said, the state supreme court
recognized this particular JSA presented
a rather " unique issue " within the context
of an RUS fee exception, viz. " the city
benefits from the school district's services,
yet the park remains open and free to the
general public. " The state supreme court,
however, noted that the Idaho RUS " contemplates that land owners may enter into
leases or other arrangements within the
protection of the statute. "
Under subsection (e), a private entity
may lease land to the state, presumably
for compensation or profit, yet immunity
may be extended so long as the land is
leased " for recreational purposes " and no
charge is levied against the public for access or use of the land. I.C. § 36-1604(e)
As characterized by the court, the
arrangement between the city and the
school district was " not unlike a landlease agreement expressly contemplated
by Idaho's Recreational Use Statute "
between a private entity and the state. In
particular, the court noted the JSA between the city and the school district specifically articulated that the arrangement
was " intended to better allocate resources for the mutual best interest of developing outdoor recreational facilities for
general public outdoor recreation use. "
Moreover, regardless of the " general
character of the property, " here a school/
park, the court found the " compensation
exception " to the RUS applied as long as
the property was " gratuitously accessible " for " public recreational space. "
The intent and purpose of Idaho's
Recreational Use Statute is to provide
July 2016 - Parks & Recreation

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