AOPA Pilot Magazine - March 2014 - 69

midway through the flight, the
heading bug was set to approximately runway heading, and the
vertical speed (and pitch attitude) began to oscillate. During an
approximate 25-second period, the
vertical speed decreased to about 0,
then increased to about 2,200 fpm
up, then decreased again and settled about 700 to 750 fpm up.
"During the oscillation, the vertical speed indicator changed from
0 to 700 fpm, where it remained for
about 16 seconds, until it changed
to 850 fpm up. During controlled
flight just prior to impact, the
airplane was climbing and acceler-

Contributing to the accident were
the low ceiling, reduced visibility,
dark night conditions, and rising
mountainous terrain."
COMMENTARY

Night flying in the mountains is
tough anytime, and especially bad
when the weather is poor. The
temperature/dew point spread had
been within one or two degrees
for much of the day with rain.
Neither of Front Royal's circling
approaches is authorized at night.
The weather apparently was marginal VFR, so a VFR arrival was
legal but ill-considered. A far safer

imperative before takeoff that all
bugs are set, and the initial headings and altitudes-including
turns-are memorized or written
on Post-it notes, so that full attention can be devoted to establishing
positive climb and getting the aircraft on the correct path and away
from the ground. Nothing else
matters at that point.
While takeoff to the west was
inadvisable, it appears that the
weather technically was VFR,
but mountains have a chameleonlike ability to disappear at night.
Treat night flight in any hilly terrain, or where the airport area

That Front Royal was only 10 minutes
away from his son's school was a seductive
and dangerous alternative.
ating, reaching a pressure altitude
of approximately 2,200 feet msl and
an indicated airspeed of 140 knots.
About six seconds before the end
of the recording, the airplane began
a steep descending turn to the left
(roll attitude reached a peak value
of 95 degrees left wing down, pitch
attitude reached a peak of about 27
degrees nose down).
"Prior to takeoff, the Desired
Course parameter was set to about
050 degrees, where it remained
throughout the flight. The course
selection was consistent with
a magnetic course from Front
Royal to COGAN. Just after the
airplane began its takeoff roll, a
global positioning system waypoint of COGAN was selected. The
primary navigation source was
set to GPS number 1. The airplane did not fly toward COGAN,
consistent with the global positioning system steering mode of the
autopilot system not being selected."
PROBABLE CAUSE

The NTSB determined the probable causes of this accident as
follows: "The pilot's failure to
maintain clearance from rising
mountainous terrain, and his failure to turn toward his assigned
course during initial climb.

plan would have been to drive
only 25 minutes to Winchester
Regional Airport with a full ILS
and more open terrain. That Front
Royal was only 10 minutes away
from his son's school was a seductive and dangerous alternative.
Front Royal's elevation is 709
feet msl and the impact occurred at
about 1,300 msl, allowing for trees
at the accident site. The nearby
ridgeline then rises to about 2,000
feet msl. Onboard flight data monitoring showed the Cirrus climbing
to 2,200 feet before rolling off to
the left and entering a steep nosedown attitude. Final airspeed was
not reported. The pitch oscillations on climbout indicate some
level of distraction.
The aircraft was equipped with
TAWS, assuming it was selected
for display. Sometimes pilots tend
to discount the warnings because
they occur in normal phases of flight
close to the ground. It is conceivable
that the pilot may have belatedly
realized the TAWS warnings were
real and pulled the aircraft into an
accelerated stall. That might explain
the sharp left wing down and steep
pitch down attitude.
Mode confusion or lack of
a plan also may have contributed to the erratic flight path. It's

is unfamiliar, as an instrument
flight. That means following any
published departure procedures.
Front Royal's approved obstacle
departure procedure is to depart
on Runway 10 with a climbing
left turn to the north toward the
Martinsburg VOR.
The guidance on Front Royal's
obstacle clearance departure
pages of the NACO charts is cryptic: "Runway 28: NA-Obstacles."
More emphasis and clarity would
be much safer. For example,
"Runway 28-No takeoff-High
terrain 3 nm west of airport." Of
course, to heed the warning it has
to be read.
The Cirrus SR22 is a lot of airplane for a new pilot. Despite
excellent new safety technology, the
tools still have to be used correctly
and IFR basics still are required.
Night operations in the mountains have considerable risk with
little margin. For CFIIs, we might
spend considerably more time drilling into new instrument pilots the
importance of knowing the territory
surrounding the airport, departure
procedures, and technology configuration. It's just as important when
leaving as it is arriving.
AOPA
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AOPA Pilot Magazine - March 2014

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