AOPA Pilot Magazine - February 2015 - 16

WAYPOINTS

Automation:
A balanced approach

BY THOMAS B. HAINES
Editor in Chief

When highfalutin goes over the top

EDITOR IN CHIEF

Thomas B. Haines
enjoys using
technology in the
cockpit, but enjoys
hand-flying more.

16 | AOPA PILOT February 2015

THE DEBATE about the proper role of automation
in the cockpit probably started the day that Sperry
Corporation developed the first autopilot in 1912. Some
of the pilots of the day undoubtedly declared the contraption was for wimps. They are probably the same
ones who secretly were afraid of the technology.
We saw the same reaction in the 1980s when "glass
cockpits" showed up in business aircraft and airliners. Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS) were
basically representations of conventional gauges on a
cathode ray tube. In a few cases, the round dials were
replaced by vertical tapes, which started controversy
about how information should be displayed-one that
continues today. Some airline pilots retired rather than
deal with the transition to the new technology.
Automation throughout our lives charges on, changing everything from how we operate our cars to how we
cook dinner. Most would agree that automatic transmissions have made driving easier-and, in some cases,
less fun. I like a stick shift for weekend driving, but I'm
happy to have an automatic in beltway traffic.
When it comes to our "modern" airplanes-which
may only be modern in the cockpit-automation can
improve safety and reliability, increase situational
awareness, and increase redundancy. Yet, despite the
progress, we continue to see a high level of accidents
where pilots seem too dependent on automation.
As NTSB Acting Chairman Chris Hart pointed out at
the National Business Aviation Association Convention
in Orlando last fall, the Air France Flight 447 accident
is an example. Pilots of all levels can wonder how it is
that three highly trained, experienced airline pilots flying one of the most modern and capable aircraft ever
designed could allow it to get away from them and plummet into the Atlantic Ocean because of the failure in the
pitot static system. Based on available information, it
appears that if they had simply pushed the nose over and
properly used thrust, they could have flown on safely
to their destination. Failure of a pitot-static system is
something that is easily replicated in training, but combined with multiple failures in the system, darkness, and
the turbulence from a nearby thunderstorm, the pilots
seemingly misread the remaining instruments and mismanaged the situation. If they had been in an airplane
with more basic instrumentation and been well trained

in its weaknesses, could they have recognized the situation and responded differently? And if that had made a
difference in that particular case, how might the safety
record be different on a day-to-day basis if we declared
that we shouldn't build so much automation into modern airplanes? How frequently are accidents prevented
by automation that we aren't even aware might otherwise have happened?
Asiana Flight 214's crash at San Francisco
International appears to be related to the crew's failure to recognize that their airplane was too slow on the
approach. Rather than simply bump up the thrust, they
watched the speed diminish to the point that their perfectly functioning airplane crashed.
A more recent accident also appears to be airspeed
related. An Embraer Phenom 100 business jet, one of
the most modern business jets available, appears to have
gotten too slow on final to the Montgomery County
Airpark in Gaithersburg, Maryland, in December 2014.
Initial reports suggest the pilot overshot the final and
then, in attempting to correct, did not apply additional
thrust-despite cockpit warnings of an impending stall.
He lost control of the airplane and it plummeted into a
neighborhood, setting a house on fire, killing a mother
and her two children as well as all three aboard the jet.
As Hart relayed to an audience at the NBAA convention, modern subway trains have become so automated
that the "drivers" are bored and not engaged in the operation of the train. So when something goes wrong, the
operators are not in the operational loop. Hart challenged cockpit designers to come up with new ways to
leverage automation while keeping crews engaged and
aware of their surroundings. As with many other things
in life, it's all about balance-balancing the benefits of
automation against the need to have pilots engaged for
when the automation takes a powder. The good news is
that hand-flying is an effective antidote to over-automation, an antidote that is being built into many training
curricula. And who wouldn't argue that hand-flying-
at least during some phases of flight-isn't a whole lot
more fun than watching George ply the skies? AOPA
EMAIL thomas.haines@aopa.org

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AOPA Pilot Magazine - February 2015

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - February 2015