AOPA Pilot Magazine - August 2020 - 77

indicating it likely broke on a
previous flight and remained
undetected because of the
minimal impact on engine
and aircraft performance.
Flying solo on the way down
to Scottsdale in his first flight
in the mishap airplane, it's
likely the reduced performance went unnoticed by
the CFI, who had no basis
for reference in that airplane. Typical engine run-up
checks, which focus on magneto performance and rpm
differentials, would not have
exposed the anomaly.
The NTSB investigators
determined-and a consensus of outside airframe and
powerplant mechanics and
inspectors agreed-that a broken valve spring likely would
not have degraded engine performance to the point that it
would cause the accident as
described. However, it would
have contributed to the accident by precluding the full
capability of the engine to
help overcome a precarious weight and balance.
Similarly, being 4 percent
over gross weight would not
cause the extreme oscillations
observed at rotation and liftoff, but it would exacerbate
them and, together with the
underperforming engine,
compound the effect on aircraft performance.
For some reason, the
ATP-rated CFI with more
than 5,000 total hours and
69 in the three months preceding the accident, wasn't
alarmed by the Comanche's
load. Perhaps he didn't fully
comprehend the criticality of
center-of-gravity calculations
for light GA airplanes. Maybe
he did, but the reputation of

the venerable Comanche led
to overconfidence in the aircraft's capabilities. It could
have been that he was surprised by the passenger load
and didn't want to deliver bad
news: that someone would
have to remain behind.
The CFI seemed to be
under time pressure, departing with a new student on a
night cross-country, roughly
26 minutes after arriving.
Such haste would have precluded sufficient preflight
planning, preparation, and
briefing that should have
revealed the CG problem.
This would be an ideal flight
for a CFI to demonstrate the
importance of weight and
balance calculations, and the
responsibility of a pilot in
command to make the right
decision in a tough circumstance. In addition to typical
cross-country route analysis, discussion on night
operations and the added
challenges night imposes in
unfamiliar aircraft was warranted. The Comanche's
heavy weight characteristics
should have been discussed.
Preceding all of that instruction should have been talk on
the fundamentals of how the
CFI and student will operate,
including positive transfer of
aircraft control and duties
during an emergency.
The four people in the
back, and perhaps the student
pilot, didn't have the knowledge, training, or experience to
recognize the gross weight and
center of gravity problems that
would ultimately take their
lives. The CFI did, or should
have. He was trained and certified by the FAA not just to
understand these dynamics,

but to teach them. It seems
that a combination of time
pressure, overconfidence in
the airplane, and overconfidence in his own ability led
to a dismissive approach to
his instruction that night.
Combined with a bit of bad
luck in an underperforming
engine, the fates of all six people were in peril before they
boarded the airplane. AOPA
EMAIL richard.mcspadden@

aopa.org

NEW FROM ASI
Returning to flight in the face of COVID-19
As we progress through the COVID-19 pandemic and
states modify social distancing restrictions, many
aviation operators are beginning to reopen, and
formerly grounded pilots are returning to flight. To
aid in this process, AOPA and the AOPA Air Safety
Institute have created two guides to help operators
and pilots facilitate a safe return to operations. The
Return-to-Flight Proficiency Plan for pilots, sponsored by Hartzell Propeller, includes profiles for
VFR and IFR pilots and is designed to give a clear,
step-by-step approach to refreshing knowledge and
sharpening skills that degrade after a period of inactivity, such as grounding because of local quarantine
orders. Proficiency degrades progressively the longer a pilot remains inactive, and the guide reminds
pilots to expect a different level of performance after
extended time on the ground.
Either rusty pilots or dormant aircraft can be problematic. In combination, they present an expanded risk
to aviation safety. AOPA's guidance takes these factors
into consideration and aims to help ease the transition to
reopening while maintaining a high standard of safety.
The COVID-19 Flight Operations Guide is designed
to help flight schools, flying clubs, FBOs, and other
aircraft operators move "from risk 'avoidance' to risk
management." The guide provides factors to consider
when making the decision to open and offers suggestions on how to do so carefully while monitoring for
signs of sustained operational wellness.
"AOPA recognizes operators have some difficult
choices to make under unprecedented circumstances,"
said Richard McSpadden, executive director of the
AOPA Air Safety Institute. "The COVID-19 guide offers
them a framework for how to assess their situation
and then some suggestions on steps they can take to
resume and sustain operations."
airsafetyinstitute.org/returntoflight

aopa.org/pilot AOPA PILOT | 77

http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/returntoflight http://www.aopa.org/pilot

AOPA Pilot Magazine - August 2020

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - August 2020