Premium On Safety - Issue 14, 2014 - 7

SmS CoRNER

Safety Culture...

(continued from page 6)

* Are you prepared to be challenged and
not fight back or get defensive? Even
if by a crew member who has not been
in your flight department for long? How
about by someone outside your discipline (pilot, mechanic, scheduler/
dispatcher, flight attendant, administrative personnel)? How soon do your
defenses rise? And then lower?
* Are you willing to alter your own
thoughts and actions? How can the
flight department leaders expect all
flight department members to do what
they themselves are not willing to do?
* Can you easily and clearly state why
you disagree?

* Is it a safety culture only if you don't
have to do any of the work? Or change
your own behavior?
Remember: An accident or incident is simply
a series of safety lapses. Could your inattention to your surroundings and actions be one
key element in the series? When your mind
suppresses your behavior situation awareness, by doing nothing, you are an active
contributor to your unsafe environment. What
behaviors are you missing or ignoring?
References:
* nbaa.org/ops/safety/top-safetyfocus-areas

* Parasuraman, R., Molloy, R., & Singh,
I. L. (1993). Performance Consequences
of Automation-Induced 'Complacency'.
The International Journal of Aviation
Psychology, 3, 1, 1-23.
* skybrary.aero/index.php/
Complacency
Dr. Shari Frisinger, President of CornerStone
Strategies LLC, using her expertise in brain
science and human behaviors, works with aviation leaders to reduce conflict and improve communication to increase safety and service levels. She can be reached at www.ShariFrisinger.
com, Shari@CornerStoneStrategiesLLC.com,
or 281.992.4136.

LESSoNS LEARNED

Case By Case

PART 2 of 4

By DAVID JACK KENNy

Reports suggest that not everyone who flies
actually likes to study aviation accidents.
(One balloon pilot of our acquaintance
flatly refuses to read about, listen to, or
even acknowledge the possibility of any
misfortune befalling lighter-than-air craft.)
The value of mining the accident record is
appreciated, though, by those whose safety
responsibilities extend beyond their own individual flights. There's nothing quite like the
demonstration that certain courses of action
have predictably dire consequences to discourage those particular choices. Our last
issue offered some tips on how to find the
information you want-but once you've got it,
how do you put it to work?
Broadly speaking, there are two main
options: case studies and statistical analysis. Each has strengths the other lacks and
appeals to a distinct set of personalities.
Statistics make their point through sheer
weight of numbers, and when the numbers are
overpowering they can be very effective indeed.
The fact, for example, that nearly 90 percent of
VFR-into-IMC accidents are fatal should get the
attention not just of VFR-only pilots, but anyone
who feels tempted to skip the bother of filing
an IFR flight plan in marginal weather.
Case studies don't offer that perspective
of scale, but their emotional immediacy
makes them more compelling to a broader

audience. (Let's face it, not everyone has a
head for numbers-even numbers as lopsided
as "90 percent".) Rather than the anonymity
of collective data, the reader is brought faceto-face with recognizable people and the
specific situations, pressures, and personality

The value of mining the
accident record is appreciated,
though, by those whose safety
responsibilities extend beyond
their own individual flights.
traits that led them into harm's way. The
fact that the pilot of a New Mexico State
Patrol rescue helicopter (airsafetyinstitute.
org/acsrescue) had served in the armed
forces and law enforcement for more than
a decade before he began his flight training

may provide some insight into his decision
to attempt a mountainside takeoff in IMC at
night rather than sheltering in place until the
storm passed.
Other than relevance to your subject matter, what makes a good case study? A couple
of qualities come to mind. It helps if the accident chain is complex enough to offer multiple points at which a different decision might
have averted disaster; this builds narrative
tension while driving home your underlying
message. The Beech Debonair pilot who
ended up attempting a 180-degree turn 100
feet above a mountain road in a snowstorm
(airsafetyinstitute.org/acs_vfrimc) had
been told by three Flight Service briefers and
two air traffic controllers that the weather
ahead was unflyable, but even after seeing it
for himself he chose to press on. He passed
up multiple chances to divert before finally
recognizing that he'd gotten in over his head.
By then it was too late.
Extraordinary circumstances that raise
the stakes of either making or cancelling
the flight naturally add to the drama. A
Bell 206 crashed in a Florida swamp
(airsafetyinstitute.org/accident_Bell206)
taking a surgeon and his assistant to harvest
a donor heart. In addition to time pressure-
only two hours round trip were available for
travel if the organ was to remain viable-the
(continued on page 8)

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Complacency http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Complacency http://www.ShariFrisinger.com http://www.ShariFrisinger.com http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/top-safety-focus-areas http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/acs_vfrimc http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/accident_Bell206 http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/acsrescue http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/acsrescue

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