Premium on Safety - Issue 36, 2020 - 6

ASI MESSAGE
LESSONS
LEARNED

Speculation vs Hard Truths

EDITOR'S NOTE
This article and the studies it cites were developed before the novel coronavirus swept the globe. We acknowledge that new
"unknowns" may shift some of the piece's projections, but keep in mind these go out 20 years. Factors influencing aviation trends
before the pandemic form a vital baseline for navigating the current challenges and will help business aviation emerge as an even
stronger industry. Read on, and be well.

FOCUS POINT

What's Business Aviation Worth?
Business aviation, notably on-demand charter is picking up.
Will we be able to keep up with the demand?
BY AMY LABODA
Two hundred and forty seven billion dollars. That's what
general aviation (GA) is worth to the U.S. economy, according
to a new report. The upbeat Contribution of General Aviation
to the US Economy in 2018 was released February 19. It
was prepared for seven industry associations: AOPA, the
General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Aircraft
Electronics Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association,
the Helicopter Association International, the National Air
Transportation Association, and the National Business Aviation
Association, by consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers with
support from Jetnet LLC and Conklin & de Decker. The report
shows how critical business and general aviation are to the
nation's infrastructure, and how it is growing.
It is not the only recent news that shows a long-term positive
outlook for GA. The FAA Aerospace Forecast 2019-2039 indicates
that the active general aviation fleet is forecast to remain
relatively level. The number of general aviation hours flown is
projected to increase an average of 0.8 percent per year through
2039, as growth in turbine, rotorcraft, and experimental hours
more than offset a decline in fixed wing piston hours.
In 2018, general aviation deliveries increased in both piston and
turbine segments. Single engine piston deliveries of the U.S.

manufactured aircraft were up 3.5 percent, while the smaller
category of multiengine piston deliveries went up by 41.5
percent. Business jet deliveries were up by 17.1 percent, and
turboprop deliveries were up by 8.6 percent.
The total active general aviation fleet is expected to decrease,
however, the turbine-powered fleet (including rotorcraft) is
projected to grow by an average rate of 2.0 percent a year over
the forecast period, with the turbojet fleet increasing 2.2 percent
a year. Hours flown by turbine aircraft (including rotorcraft) are

The total active general aviation fleet is
expected to decrease, however, the turbinepowered fleet (including rotorcraft) is
projected to grow by an average rate of 2.0
percent a year over the forecast period.
forecast to increase 2.4 percent yearly over the forecast period.
Jet aircraft are expected to account for most of the increase,
with hours flown increasing at an average annual rate of 3.1

Don't speculate. This is a
common rebuke directed
at those discussing a recent
aviation accident, and it's
been drilled into our culture.
We've learned that the root
cause of an accident can be
quite different than what may
seem obvious. It's a sensible
posture that has kept us
(and some public agencies) from acting on erroneous theories with
ineffective or even counterproductive remedies. Often, though, the
"don't speculate" principle is misapplied to mute all discussion until
an investigation is fully complete, thereby delaying an opportunity to
reinforce important learning.
Speculation is forming a theory without firm evidence. A person who
happens to see an airplane crash near a runway is speculating when
he or she says, "The aircraft must have stalled." It's not speculation
to piece together known facts such as weather, winds, aircraft state,
flight path, and air traffic control communications, and deduce a likely
cause. The distinction is important. Informed analysis based on facts
and experience can be helpful in emphasizing lessons learned while
the event is still fresh.
The helicopter crash that killed nine people, including L.A. Lakers
basketball star Kobe Bryant, is a case in point. The NTSB advised
it would likely be more than a year before the investigation is
complete (but has also recently announced reforms aimed at
reducing investigation timelines). Meanwhile, enough facts have been
determined to ascertain what likely happened and summarize lessons
learned that are beneficial for pilots to consider now.
According to investigators, the Sikorsky S-76 was flown by a single,
experienced pilot under VFR per the operator's Part 135 limitations.
The pilot departed in marginal VFR conditions over flat terrain,
traversed busy airspace, and-in worsening weather and visibility-
followed a prominent highway into rising terrain. He climbed to avoid
a cloud layer, began a left turn, and then made a sharp descent that
peaked at 4,000 fpm. A witness observed the helicopter emerge from
the mist descending at high speed and roll sharply left a few seconds
prior to ground impact. NTSB experts have, so far, found no evidence
of engine or flight control problems. It's not speculation to deduce that
this is likely a spatial disorientation accident. Several lessons from this
tragedy will remain relevant, regardless of additional findings.

1. Flying VFR into instrument meteorological conditions is dangerous,
regardless of your experience and ratings. A third of these
accidents happen to experienced, IFR-rated pilots and they are
usually lethal. Falter into IMC and you are likely to die.
2. The gray area between flying on instruments and flying by
visual reference is far more challenging than just flying on
instruments. This hybrid arena, often borne of indecision, can
provoke visual illusions. Pilots anxious to gain visual context
can convince themselves of visual recognition that isn't present.
The consequences are exacerbated at low altitude by reduced
opportunity to recover.
3. Low visibility in hilly terrain is especially treacherous. False
horizons from multiple illusory effects can occur. Tiers of sloping
cloud decks against rolling, layered hillsides are insidiously
disorienting. Lights from cars, houses, or other sources can add to
a misperception of aircraft attitude. Recognition is slow and often
too late.
4. Fog, and in particular coastal fog, is unpredictable and can move
in dense waves. Fog hinders depth perception, so it's difficult to
determine where it gets worse. It can seem tolerable, then thicken
quickly into hard IMC.
5. Flights, conditions, and decisions must be assessed more
conservatively when operating single pilot. There is no one to
cross-check a decision, and no help to alleviate task saturation,
an especially perilous state when operating a helicopter at low
altitude in hilly terrain with limited visibility amid busy airspace.
This flight was extraordinarily demanding for a single pilot.
6. The most important decision pilots will ever make is made every
time they fly, and that is whether or not to fly. We often talk of
advancing skills in terms of knowledge and stick-and-rudder
skills. We rarely think of advancing our skills relative to decision
making, yet pilot decision making is a part of most fatal accidents.
Decision-making skills need just as much work and continued
development as stick-and-rudder skills. It only takes one lapse in
judgment on one flight for a tragic ending.
We don't need to wait a year or more for the full investigation to
emphasize some important lessons from the tragedy in Calabasas,
California. It's not speculation to analyze an abundance of facts,
determine what likely happened-with a caveat that we're not
completely sure-and emphasize promptly some important lessons
that may prevent a future tragedy.

RICHARD G. MCSPADDEN, JR.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AOPA AIR

contd. on page 8

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