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to be: cool! My second was to wonder, "If this
is how things are at the training center with a
standardization examiner aboard, what will it be
like at an operational unit?"
I wondered for a time whether that was actually
a test I'd failed, played out just to see if I would
assertively object. That training flight experience
was not at all congruent with the cultures at my
first two flying units, which were positive and
well-grounded in the rules. Seven years into flying
I became a flight examiner at that same training
center and was immersed in its culture, where
I became certain there were never sanctioned
rookie rituals like that. It was easy to see by then
it had been an exceedingly poor example for
someone in a mentor role to set, done in one of
the worst possible contexts. When my original
examiner was later removed from flying for the
service under circumstances implying a loss of
confidence, the dots seemed connected. It would
be tidy to say I took nothing from this individual
for my own flying toolkit. But I'm relating all this
decades later, so....
When we're driven to seek examples to follow,
we see them all. That underscores clear-eyed
investment is needed on both ends of the
transaction; on the one hand to set positive
examples worthy of being followed, and on the
BY
M. SPANGLER
otherSCOTT
to recognize
examples that shouldn't be
copied for what they really are. You do hundreds
of things every day. In aviation roles, perhaps
it's making checklists, planning trips, doing
maintenance procedures, making radio calls,
briefing approaches, fueling and towing, training
and supervising others, managing passengers and
cargo, or applying your personal techniques to
tasks. People are always watching and listening
intently to your example. Meanwhile, you're doing
it too. It's good to frequently rekindle awareness
that in those observations the paths of individuals'
safety and careers, as well as group safety cultures
are formed and steered. What are you putting out?
What are you taking in? I hope it's the good stuff.
Stay well, fly smart, and fly safe.

Paul Ratté
Director of Aviation Safety Programs, USAIG

SAFETY SPOTLIGHT
medevacs were single-pilot, and the U.S. Coast Guard Air Operations Manual
(dated 2018) says its short-range recovery helicopter, the MH-65 Dolphin, can
fly single-pilot during daylight visual meteorological conditions.
Helicopter air ambulances fly single-pilot for several reasons, said Raj
Helweg, chief pilot of Air Methods, a Part 135 operator with more than 300
air ambulances nationwide. Given their reliability and technology, turbine
helicopters that earn single-pilot certification do not compromise safety. All
HAAs must be equipped with helicopter terrain awareness and warning systems
(HTAWS), radio altimeters, and recording flight data monitoring systems.
Another factor is weight and balance. With fuel, a crew of three and a cabin
half-filled with medical monitoring and support equipment and supplies that
make it a flying emergency room, there has to be room and useful load left
for the patient. Part 135 requires HAA operators to develop and document a

Given their reliability and technology, turbine
helicopters that earn single-pilot certification do
not compromise safety.
weight and balance program that uses the "actual weights for crew members,
medical personnel and carry-on medical equipment (not permanently
installed in the aircraft), and only relying on solicited or estimated weights for
patients, regardless the size of the helicopter."
Economics also plays a role. HAA operations are not inexpensive, and
keeping crews to their essential minimums keeps operating costs within the
parameters desired by those who contract their services.
Given the helicopters employed and all of the risk mitigating requirements
involved in every flight, and the flight's reason for taking place-medical
transport-trading a hands-on member of the medical crew for a second pilot
doesn't work well in the overall safety equation. With three required flight
crew, HAAs go one better than two pilots because the industry standard for
crew resource management is "Three to go, one to say no," said Helweg.
That means a pilot cannot launch unless all members of the crew agree
that they have mitigated the risks. "That is the basic tenet of our operation.
Medical personnel are required crew members. The pilot in command is
the ultimate authority, but any member of the crew can stop a flight at any
point if they see anything that pushes the flight into a higher risk level. Their
obligation is to raise their hand and say, let's stop this. Each member of the
crew is a front-line risk manager."
But the crew is not the only player in HAA risk management, a process that
starts when someone requests a flight. The Air Methods call center connects
the requester to the appropriate HAA base. "After considering the weather,
weight, crew weight, fuel, and all the other limitations," said Helweg, "the pilot
either declines the request or makes an initial acceptance."
If the pilot accepts, this triggers a documented risk analysis, which is a
component of the electronic flight bag used by Air Methods. Participating
in this analysis is an operational control specialist (OCS) at the operational
control center (OCC), which is required for Part 135 HAA operators with 10 or
more bases and recommended for all air ambulance operators.

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