Premium on Safety - Issue 46, 2022 - 12

BEST PRACTICES
them with their avionics technicians for
troubleshooting and updating. When you power
up a Garmin unit with FlightStream 510, it
generates the Wi-Fi signal and displays the
password for connection right on the avionics.
The security is installed on the user account
that connects to the avionics. As more planes
are directly connected to the internet with
systems like Go-Go Inflight and Starlink, the
threat of malware and virus injection will grow
more plausible. Uploading data to sophisticated
airplane systems increasingly resembles
standard network addressing protocols. This
same pathway could be used to invade an
onboard avionics system if it is connected
directly to the internet. The heads-up for pilots
is to remember and utilize the solution to any
rogue autopilot action (either for failed servos
or a hacked system). The first line of defense
is the red-button disconnect. Failing that,
remove power from the system with the circuit
breaker. Without power, this system is not
going anywhere by itself! We all need to remain
vigilant for any reports of actual control system
hacking in this brave new world.
Outside the cockpit, other hazards exist that
can affect flight. A common interconnected
attack vector for hackers in larger airplanes
is the ancient VHF Controller Pilot
Data Link Communications (CPDLC)
messaging system (basically text over a VHF
channel). This notoriously unsecure datalink
often transmits critical guidance information
like flight plans and routing changes. These
communications are often imported directly
into the flight management system. An
erroneously imported CPDLC message could
easily send a plane of any size in the wrong
direction on a spurious routing. A recently
implemented variant of this system is appbased
and delivered by text running through
the internet on applications like ForeFlight.
Under the category of " mischief and mayhem, "
hackers have known for years how easy it
is to create " ghost aircraft " on the ADS-B
(airplane surveillance) network. This has safety
implications with inflight aircraft maneuvering
to avoid false targets created by hackers.
The last cyberthreat outside the cockpit is
GPS spoofing, which sends a false location
signal to your avionics. Aviation has pretty
much become totally dependent on a single
source navigation system. This creates a
vulnerability if that data stream were in
any way modified or corrupted. Hackers
have discovered easy ways to change
the indicated GPS position with fake
signal generation. Fortunately, it would
require a pretty strong signal to interfere
The internet is a great place to start studying up on the
weak spots that are vulnerable to hackers in an airplane.
with an airplane in flight (military grade).
But Homeland Security is already deeply
concerned (and we should be too)! Doesn't
that make you feel too confident when you are
on a tight instrument approach? Obviously,
we have many threats, and vigilance is a
necessary weapon for every pilot. Fly safely
out there (and often).
David St. George is a Master Flight Instructor/FAA
DPE/ATP(ME-SE) and Part 135 pilot.
12

https://ipadpilotnews.com/2019/01/how-to-use-pre-departure-clearances-and-digital-atis-in-foreflight/ https://ipadpilotnews.com/2019/01/how-to-use-pre-departure-clearances-and-digital-atis-in-foreflight/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267557712_Ghost_in_the_AirTraffic_On_insecurity_of_ADS-B_protocol_and_practical_attacks_on_ADS-B_devices https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_System_%28GPS%29_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf https://www.computerworld.com/article/2472455/curious-hackers-inject-ghost-airplanes-into-radar--track-celebrities--flights.html https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_System_%28GPS%29_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf https://nextnav.com/gps-spoofing/ https://itoolab.com/ad/anygo/?affid=ed14f71f-8594-46a7-a81a-adab6840f84b&msclkid=ba0c72144cb411a92849110619f148ec&utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=21%2F4%2F28_Anygo_iOS_General_US%2FUK%2FCA%2FFR&utm_term=spoof%20cell%20phone%20location&utm_content=Spoof%3A%20Spoof%20Phone%20Location https://itoolab.com/ad/anygo/?affid=ed14f71f-8594-46a7-a81a-adab6840f84b&msclkid=ba0c72144cb411a92849110619f148ec&utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=21%2F4%2F28_Anygo_iOS_General_US%2FUK%2FCA%2FFR&utm_term=spoof%20cell%20phone%20location&utm_content=Spoof%3A%20Spoof%20Phone%20Location https://skybrary.aero/articles/controller-pilot-data-link-communications-cpdlc#:~:text=Controller%20Pilot%20Data%20Link%20Communications%20%28CPDLC%29%20is%20a,an%20aircraft%20as%20an%20alternative%20to%20voice%20communications https://skybrary.aero/articles/controller-pilot-data-link-communications-cpdlc#:~:text=Controller%20Pilot%20Data%20Link%20Communications%20%28CPDLC%29%20is%20a,an%20aircraft%20as%20an%20alternative%20to%20voice%20communications

Premium on Safety - Issue 46, 2022

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of Premium on Safety - Issue 46, 2022