AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - April 2019 - T-20

T-20 | 

The preliminary report offers little
insight into why the crew was unable to stop
the airplane. The brake anti-skid switch had
been placarded inoperative, but even without
it, braking action should have been sufficient
to slow the airplane perceptibly. Investigators
found the flaps and slats deployed and the
parking brake off. Examination of braking
system components, engines, and control
systems-and analysis of the cockpit voice
recorder-presumably are still in progress.
Other questions center on the operator
and crew. Investigators quickly determined
that the pilot flying left seat, a 49-year-old,
11,650-hour airline transport pilot, was
type-rated in Learjets and Westwinds but
held only a second-in-command rating for
the Falcon 50. The 66-year-old in the right
seat, identified in press reports as the owner
of the company operating the airplane, was
a 5,500-hour private pilot with multiengine
qualifications but no instrument rating. The
Falcon 50's type certificate requires a minimum crew of two (one of whom, needless to
say, must be qualified to act as PIC and both
of whom should be at least SIC type-rated).

The preliminary report
on the overrun of a Falcon
50 in Greenville, South
Carolina, raises more
questions than it answers.
The flight itself was operated under
Part 91 and described by the NTSB as "personal," though in post-accident interviews
the survivors didn't mention any friendship
or even acquaintance with either pilot. The
NTSB listed the operator as holding a Part
135 certificate, but neither the company
nor the aircraft appears in the FAA's most
recent listing of certificate holders (perhaps, to be fair, as a result of the accident
itself ). Friends of the right-seater referred
to his running a "charter company."
The passengers may well have been unfamiliar with the regulatory requirements for
offering common carriage. The two men in
the cockpit, however, either knew the flight
was illegal or had every reason-and an inescapable responsibility-to have known.

Details of the accident are likely to
remain murky until the NTSB's investigative team is able to catch up on its backlog
and complete its factual report. The first
responders' descriptions of the engines
"operating at full power" might perhaps
be discounted on the assumption that
they'd spent relatively little time around
jet engines running at any power setting.
Caustic characterizations of the airplane's operator that began appearing
shortly after the accident should likewise
be viewed skeptically until the factual
record is complete. In the meantime, popular attention may focus on the various ways
in which this particular flight might have
circumvented the regulations intended to
keep the flying public safe. Within the aviation community, greater interest is likely
to center on why this airplane didn't stop
on the runway. Too much speed is likely,
but history shows that all accidents are the
products of a chain of events.
AOPA
DAVID JACK KENNY is a freelance aviation

writer and airline transport pilot.

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AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - April 2019

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