AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - November 2023 - 80

and reveals decay so deep that structural
failure is underway.
To the four passengers in the
back of a Bombardier Challenger
605 jet headed from Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho, to Truckee-Tahoe Airport
near Lake Tahoe, the flight seemed
to be progressing uneventfully,
but forward of the plush interior,
operations on the flight deck were
corroding. Two pilots, unfamiliar
with each other and with the Part
91 operation they were contracted
to fly for, were struggling with crew
resource management, and more
specifically, with each other. The
43-year-old captain with a couple
hundred hours in Challenger 600s
was in command and the flying pilot
on the mishap leg. His 56-year-old
first officer had twice the captain's
by a 9,000-foot density altitude in
the hot July afternoon. The captain
decided, and the first officer
agreed, to keep the RNAV Runway
20 approach, then circle to land
on the longer Runway, 11. A fatal
decision. They didn't press the
controller for the approach they preferred.
Why did the captain decide
to accept the Runway 20 approach
and circle to Runway 11, rather than
pressing for the RNAV to 11? Maybe
he didn't want to reconfigure the
flight management system, deleting
one approach and adding another.
Maybe he didn't want to deviate 15
miles west to the initial approach fix
for Runway 11. Maybe he wanted to
cooperate with ATC and help their
flow. After all, it's a simple circle.
Once visual with Runway 20-which
keeping sight of Runway 11 in the
smoke-proved a fatal limitation.
The crew didn't brief the new
approach (a violation of their operational
procedures) and struggled
throughout the remainder of the
flight for precision and stability,
and to just get ahead of the aircraft.
ATC instructed the crew
to hold, but the captain (the pilot
flying) was slow to comply so the
first officer (the pilot monitoring)
started the turn into holding,
an egregious breach of crew protocol
for aircraft control that the
first officer would later repeat. It
would prove to be another link in
the accident chain. The pilot monitoring
handles radios and helps
with programming and confirming
the FMS, but does not initiate
Biting exchanges in the moment and delayed response to actions
requested, and needed, added to crew friction and ultimately degraded
performance on the approach.
total hours and 20 times more
Challenger 600 hours. Generational
friction, a widely recognized source
of workplace disharmony in parts
of our society, seeped into the
Bombardier cockpit. A younger, less
experienced pilot was in charge of
an older, assertive pilot, who had
likely mentored many pilots the
same age as the captain he was
now taking direction from. When
interpersonal friction occurs in
the office, at zero knots and 1 G, it's
annoying, emotionally exhausting,
and degrades productivity. When
it occurs at 150 knots on one of the
most demanding maneuvers in aviation,
it can turn deadly.
Trouble mounted in the descent
to Truckee. The crew asked for
the RNAV to Runway 11, but were
cleared for the RNAV to Runway
20. Both pilots agreed Runway 20
was too tight for their computed
4,600-foot landing distance, driven
80
AOPA PILOT / November 2023
should happen early based on a forecast
of 2,300-foot broken ceiling
and 4 to 5 miles visibility-just start
a right turn for 90 degrees to intercept
a standard left downwind for a
VFR pattern to Runway 11.
The first officer picked up the
AWOS at Truckee, but in relaying
the weather information to the
pilot, he didn't mention that smoke
had lowered visibility. Why? Maybe
he got distracted during his weather
brief to the captain. Maybe he didn't
think the reduced visibility-which
should still be 3 miles at worst-was
relevant enough to mention. If that's
what he thought, it was a misjudgment
that added to the accident
chain of events. Would the change
in visibility have impacted the captain's
decision to circle; would an
early heads up have prepared the
captain for a difficult visual pick
up? Visibility-specifically the captain's
visual troubles picking up and
a change in aircraft control without
direction, or approval from the
pilot flying, in this case, the captain.
ATC cleared the crew for the
RNAV Runway 20 approach. A
few seconds later, at the start of
the approach, the first officer commented
they were too fast and
suggested a 360-degree turn. A
maneuver and a mindset learned
through experience. The captain
rejected the request, missing a valuable
opportunity to gain time and
space to work back ahead of the
aircraft. Maybe they were behind
schedule. Maybe the younger captain
didn't want to admit to the
older first officer that he was struggling,
perhaps he wanted to prove to
the older FO, and maybe to himself,
that he could keep pace. A crucial
mistake. He would continue fast
throughout the approach and circle.
Excessive speed would be another
link in the mishap chain.
AOPA Turbine Pilot Magazine - November 2023

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