IEEE - Aerospace and Electronic Systems - August 2023 - 11

Wild
and Boeing categories exists cannot be determined from
this purely quantitative data. While this is an accepted limitation
of the methodology, it does not negate that the
observed differences are statistically significant compared
to random chance alone.
Future work is proposed to conduct a collective case
study on the statistically significant findings of this work.
The aim of this future work will be to understand why Airbus
appears to be involved in more MAC occurrences and
why Boeing appears to be involved in more RE occurrences
than expected. This would simultaneously address
the potential spike in occurrences at landing for Boeing
relative to Airbus.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this work highlighted several categories
with statistically significant differences. When looking
at all safety occurrences, the occurrence type, occurrence
category, and number of fatalities were significant.
For occurrence type, the proportion of accidents
was 10% greater than expected for Boeing and 9% less
than expected for Airbus. For occurrence category,
midair collisions were 23% greater than expected for
Airbus, while runway excursions were 32% more than
expected for Boeing. For number of fatalities, Boeing
had 28% more than expected, while Airbus had 26%
less than expected. Looking at just accidents, only the
number of fatalities was statistically significantly different;
specifically, Boeing accidents had 18% more
fatalities than expected, while Airbus accidents had
20% less fatalities than expected. In terms of the hull
loss and fatal hull loss rates per million departures,
Airbus rates have reduced more than Boeing over the
past 15 years, at a statistically significant level.
While the saying " if it ain't Boeing I ain't going " has
existed since the time of the 707 [34], it became significant
in response to the perceived issue with Airbus and
fly-by-wire [35]. This research highlights that the sentiment
is still true in relation to any other manufacturer, but
not relative to Airbus.
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