IEEE - Aerospace and Electronic Systems - July 2021 - 106

On Digital Ethics for Artificial Intelligence and Information Fusion in the Defense Domain
Figure 9.
Core elements of the concept of responsibility and the resulting mutual relationships. ß Fraunhofer FKIE.
2. For whom is responsibility borne? The relationship
between a responsible person and those for
whom he or she is responsible is characterized by
" care " and " trust " andisdeterminedbyprospective
action and reaction. Responsibility can only
be assumed by persons for persons. First, everyone
is responsible for himself or herself.
" Whoever assigns freedom of will to man, wants
to say that man is " himself " the cause of his acting
in this very way and not in another, " explained
Robert Spaemann. " And this occurs in such a way
that man himself is also responsible for his own
existence, insofar as this existence is shaped by
his own actions and certain decisions to act are at
the same time decisions about what kind of person
someone wants to be " [44]. Second, responsibility
is owed to own forces and the Common Good to
be protected. Finally, there is responsibility to
civilians and combatants. One could even speak of
responsibility toward the natural habitats in the
theaters of operations.
3. Toward whom is responsibility assumed?
Responsibility implies the notion of an authority,
which is exercised by judgment. The responsible
person recognizes it by his or her justification.
The relationship between the person and the
authority is retrospective in nature. Authorities
are God, the personal conscience of the responsible
person, the superiors, and jurisdiction exercised
by persons in the framework of courts or
justice systems.
Ultimately, it seems to be voluntarily assumed
responsibility, which shows itself in care and trust, and
in readiness to justify itself, which keeps all human
106
societies stable, not only military forces in combat.
Purely legal constructs, such as liability for damage
caused by one's actions, are not sufficient, especially in
military operations.
According to these considerations, only natural persons
and not machines, can act responsibly or irresponsibly.
For technical " things " always remain impersonal,
even if they seem to " speak " and, due to anthropomorphic
system design, a psychologically realized distinction
between man and machine may become difficult. Only
people who use cognitive machines responsibly or irresponsibly
for situational awareness and action are acting
in a " good " or " evil " way by responding to moral challenges
in one way or another. " Good " technical systems
encourage the morally acceptable and efficient leverage of
them to achieve military objectives. " Evil " systems, which
might be designed by an adversary, facilitate their irresponsible
use.
Those who place the concept of responsibility at the
center of military action must avoid representing a particular
strand in the philosophy of ethics. Without
denying that such distinctions are fruitful, this is inappropriate
in a military context. For certain actions are
also here per se-i.e., " deontologically " -qualified
as immoral. On the other hand, a " consequentialist "
weighing of consequences can be quite moral under
certain conditions. For responsibility is graded and corresponds
to the concretely existing relationship of concern
and trust. Against an opponent of war, " lies, "
measures of electronic or cyber warfare, for example,
are permitted, since he is " not at all in that moral relationship
of trust that makes truthful speech necessary "
[45]. This does not mean, however, that consequentialism
is acceptable as a moral doctrine with its tendency
to deny inalienable rights and an objective moral order
[11, pp. 33-35].
IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE
JULY 2021

IEEE - Aerospace and Electronic Systems - July 2021

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