IEEE - Aerospace and Electronic Systems - May 2022 - 23

Swinney and Woods
Table 3.
Critical Evaluation of Counter measures
Counter
measure
Physical
Jamming
Cyber
Critical evaluation
Must be lightweight. Net
mechanism must be large
enough.
Can interfere with other
frequency band users. Illegal in
some countries.
Can be difficult to perform.
Dependant on specific UAS type /
communication protocol used
which can be encrypted. Illegal in
some countries.
access, and packet spoofing are specifically considered
and proved, highlighting security vulnerabilities for WiFi-based
UASs. If vulnerabilities exist at the protocol level
in a small UAS then there is potential for platforms to be
hijacked. For example, the attacker presenting themselves
as a legitimate controller [124].
Aside from the methods considered previously there are
various reports of laser weapons for counter UAS [125],
[126], projectiles [127], [128], and even the use of animals
[129], [130].
Table 2 shows a critical evaluation of the countermeasure
methods evaluated.
Table 3 tabulates, as with detection and classification
methods, there is not one gold plated solution. Jamming is
incredibly effective but it comes with potentially serious
consequences as interference with other systems operating
in the same band could be critical, for example, hospital systems.
Cyber again can be highly effective but it is specific. It
will, therefore, not only incur cost but likely will not deal
with unknown UAS. All methods must at the very least
employ successful detection systems as a prior requisite and
physical measures require tracking alongside this.
CONCLUSION
Our review has shown a number of incidents from malicious
UASs relating to both airports and nuclear facilities,
which are of concern. Recent incidents indicate the
increased use of UASs that have longer flight times,
this should be an important consideration for researchers
working with detection and classification systems.
We must broaden our thinking to include more than just
the typical commercially available UASs. Each detection
and classification method reviewed had advantages
and disadvantages but the strongest overall system
MAY 2022
should include multiple sensors. This is not to say that
research into individual sensor types should not continue,
this work will only benefit multisensor systems in
the future. While the counter measure systems reviewed
here technically work, we still have obstacles to overcome
with their practical use, especially with respect to
legal and policy challenges.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the School of Computer
Science and Electronic Engineering , University of
Essex, U.K., and in part by the Royal Air Force, U.K.
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IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE
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