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Leccadito et al.
the consumer is not responsible for an unintended event due to a
hijacking. As technologies improve, security must be implemented
at the design level in a hybrid manner.
The responsibility of securing UASs is a combined effort of
all parties involved including the manufacturer of the sensors, the
FCS development team and manufacturer, and the UAS operators.
A solution to this problem currently does not fully exist, and as
UASs become more integrated into the commercial sector, a secure solution will become increasingly more necessary to maintain
confidence in the safe usage of UASs. Furthermore, it is important
for the end-user to be adequately trained in the use, deployment
and upgrading/updating of the CPS to keep the CPS and connected
systems secure from cyberattacks.
Although a lot of research involves securing and detecting GPS
attacks, the areas that need more emphasis in securing of the UAS
include efficiently encrypting the wireless communication channel, ensuring malicious free firmware, detection of corrupt sensors,
and securing the UAS at a hardware level. As UASs are integrated
into the commercial airspace, design, development, and operation
procedures need to evolve to meet the new demands of unmanned
and manned collaboration. Clarification of security measures in
UAS must be defined, and all parties must agree on responsibilities in regards to what needs to be secured and how to secure it, to
create safe, reliable, and trusted operations of UASs in the civilian
and commercial industries. The survey presented in this article is
a starting point that can be used to analyze current attack surfaces
to begin to create robust, resilient, and reliable safety-critical cyber
physical systems for UAS applications.

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