IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine - January/February 2024 - 86

Special Section on Security and Privacy-Aware Emerging Computing
the BS. Similarly, the MU checks the timestamp
and authentication parameters. If matched, the
MU is marked as a legal user and allowed to
access the SAGIN.
Phase II: Continuous Authentication
After the user gets access to the SAGIN, the
NCC initiates a continuous authentication
request and a biometric/behavioral data acquisition
request to the MU. The collected data are
then sent to the NCC through the BS. In the MU
registration phase, the NCC trains an AI-based
model and extracts features of the MU. In the
continuous authentication phase, the NCC compares
the real-time extracted features with the
stored features from the registration phase.
Based on the security level of the MU, the NCC
determines the legality of the user, and the transmission
terminates if it is an illegal user.
Moreover, due to the latency requirement of
the authentication, it is arduous to use high-complexity
algorithms. In phase II, a binary classification
is introduced where both spoofing actions
and spoofers are seen as spoofing attacks. For
the sake of simplicity, we focus on this scenario
as a quintessential example to validate the proposed
authentication scheme.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the security of the proposed
authentication scheme and demonstrates
its ability to prevent security threats. In our proposed
ATMAS, we have implemented five security
characteristics: mutual authentication,
forward security, resistance to replay attack,
resistance to man-in-the-middle attack, and data
confidentiality and integrity. In addition, to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed
authentication scheme, we compare it with existing
counterparts in terms of security requirements
and authentication features. By doing so,
we can show how our scheme offers improved
security and more robust authentication capabilities
in comparison to existing solutions.
Mutual Authentication: Mutual authentication
implies that two participants can
authenticate each other. In the key agreement
phase described in one-shot
86
authentication, the satellite can verify the
legitimacy of the BS by checking whether the
hash result is consistent with the credential
information saved locally. Adversaries cannot
get knowledge of the private key from
public values due to the properties of hash
function. Thus, only the legitimate BS who
owns the private key can be authenticated
by the satellite. Similarly, the BS authenticates
the satellite based on the authentication
messages from the satellite, which are
encrypted by the satellite's private key. The
secure mutual authentication between a MU
and a BS can be guaranteed using a similar
analysis. Therefore, our scheme could provide
secure mutual authentication.
Forward Security: Forward secrecy can
ensure that session keys will not be compromised
even if the long-term secrets used in
the session key exchange are compromised.
In our scheme, if an adversary learns the initial
token and wants to derive the initial
token used in the previous session, they
would need to know the previously generated
random numbers. However, the previously
generated random numbers cannot be
obtained from the previous eavesdropped
messages as the hash is a one-way function.
Therefore, our proposed scheme has the
property of forward secrecy.
Resistance to Replay Attack: Replay attack
mainly refers to when a malicious adversary
uses its message regeneration ability to generate
and replay a message, thereby
compromising protocol security. However,
this attack can be prevented by successfully
authenticating the message through checking
the validity of its timestamp value. Additionally,
because the hash function used in
initial authentication is unidirectional, an
adversary is unable to fake the message by
modifying the timestamp value. Therefore,
our proposed scheme is capable of resisting
replay attack.
Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle Attack: A
man-in-the-middle attack means that an
adversary intercepts and selectively modifies
communicated data to masquerade as one
entity involved in a communication session.
In our scheme, it is impossible for the
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