IEEE Power Electronics Magazine - September 2017 - 25

Novel
Authentication
and Key
Management
Intrusion Technology
Detection
for SCADA
Systems

Stakeholder
Engagement
Security
Architectures

Security
Technologies

Socioeconomic
Analyses

Key
Outcomes

Resilient
Control
Systems

Risk Assessment
Methods and Tools
Security Standards
Recommendations

Security
Information
Analytics

AIT Austrian
Institute of
Technology

AIT SmartEST
Laboratory

Demonstration
Sites
Nimbus
Microgrid

Fraunhofer AISEC
The Queen's
University Belfast

Consortium

Kungliga Tekniska
Högskolan
Landis + Gyr
Energieinstitut
Der Johannes
Kepler Universitat

EMC
RSA

SWW
Wunsiedel
GmbH

SWW Wunsiedel
Smart Grid

United
Technologies
Research
Centre

FIG 4 The SPARKS project overview. AISEC: Fraunhofer Research Institution for Applied and Integrated Security. (Figure used
courtesy of SPARKS.)

be tampered with as part of an attack, the behavior of the
PUF changes to immediately identify an attack. Similarly,
compliance concerns were addressed at this workshop.

Countermeasures to Secure Power Systems
Recent attacks have shown that hackers can break codes and
access the power systems and digital control through communication buses used to manage power supplies, including
uninterruptible power supplies and SCADA systems. SCADA
systems are basically process control systems (PCSs) that are
used for monitoring, gathering, and analyzing real-time environmental data. PCSs are designed to automate electronic
systems based on a predetermined set of conditions, such as
traffic control or power grid management.
The last Ukraine attack is not just a wake-up call for
grid operators worldwide, it is also one for power supply
makers whose digital power systems are grid connected
and managed using digital buses and software. In the
December 2016 issue of IEEE Power Electronics Magazine, "Expert View" columnist Patrick Le Fevre of Powerbox said "While there is very little chance that a hacker
will reach a single digital point-of-load at the board level,
the risk increases exponentially as we move upward in the
value chain. In that chain, the smart grid is probably the
highest and the most exposed to cyberattacks" [4]. In fact,
Le Fevre believes that 60% of the attacks at the board

level are coming from insiders. Consequently, he cautions
power supply makers to fully protect their programmable
devices from malicious access.
Therefore, it is not surprising that digital power supply
makers, including those using software to manage power
supplies, have begun to make plans to counter such attacks
to their Internet or network connected power systems. One
such power supply manufacturer is CUI, whose softwaredefined power (SDP) solution is deploying fast in the IT
and communications industry and in data centers around
the country. Developed jointly with Virtual Power Systems,
SDP leverages software to intelligently manage and optimize power delivery to data centers and networking systems. With this architecture, the power supply is no longer
an isolated box. It is now accessible via the Ethernet port
and, therefore, vulnerable to cyberattacks. Aware of its vulnerability, CUI is taking a number of steps to safeguard its
SDP solution and connected power supplies.
"Because our ICE switch is Ethernet connected, we will
ensure there is a secure handshake so that nothing inappropriate is plugged into the software on the other side,"
noted Paul Ruggier, CUI's design engineering manager.
Likewise, he added, the end user must also secure his
network. The end user of the software architecture will be
equally responsible, noted Ruggier. "Toward that goal, the
company plans to ink the cybersecurity agreement with
September 2017

z IEEE POWER ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Power Electronics Magazine - September 2017