IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine - March 2015 - 149

turning point (continued from p. 152)
and speaking statues is the fact that
their parenthood is in question [5].
Contrary to such conceptions, Girard's
monsters have no forebears: mimetic
monsters exist only in the eye of their
double, or their mimetic rival. Girardian monstrosity is not an objective feature of worldly creatures: it, too,
emerges from imitation.
The general meaning of monster is
that of one's lack of belonging to a definite category, an oscillation between
two opposites, a being with a blurred
identity. When identical copies fail to be
fully identified with one another, both
their identity and their difference
become significant. Paradoxical situations involving these distinctions feature in most narratives of perfection:
"Atque oculos idem qui decipit incitat
error," says Ovid about Narcissus in one
example [6]. When an otherwise unremarkable human interaction-e.g.,
enjoying the beauty of someone's face-
crosses the threshold between humanness and perfection, it provokes an
abrupt reversal of the individual's status
and of our moral judgment pertaining
to such a person with blurred identity.
Perfect identity will arouse suspicion,
then beget a sensation of monstrosity
and produce a sacred eclipse of undifferentiation (a hell of a face).
Thus, the requirement of undifferentiation is altered. This can be understood structurally. In the experience of a
monstrous double, says Girard, "the differences are not eliminated, but muddied and confused" so that the
monstrous double occupies an equivocal middle ground between difference
and unity [2, p. 170-172]. Such categorical indistinction, or, to use Girard's
expression, "the crisis of differences,"
leads to the uncertain identity of the
monster-or of a robot locked at this
intermediate position of close, albeit
imperfect, resemblance with a human.
Girard writes:
The cultural order is nothing
more than a regulated system of
distinctions in which the differences among individuals are

used to establish their "identity"
and their mutual relationships...
When differences begin to shift
back and forth the cultural
order loses its stability; all its
elements constantly shift places
[2, pp. 52, 167].
The instability of the cultural, social,
moral, and legal categories shaken by
the interaction with a robot from the
uncanny valley is a source of perceived
unease. However, there is more to be
said. In a human-robot interaction, the
robot, unlike the human agent, cannot
have feelings. This makes the interaction asymmetric. The agent's feelings
cannot be matched by a similar emotional response from the robot. Structural mimetic dynamics will go on, but
the moral component, which is responsible for the blurring of social categories, remains one-sided, effectively
locking the human agent in his own
feelings. In a symmetric situation,
Girard's theory shows that the other's
attitude helps to restore peace through
a violent resolution of conflict driven
by the double bind. In the asymmetric
case, a robotic monster falls out with
this mechanism. This makes it the most
formidable of Girardian monsters. A
robot is not disturbed by uncanniness
and has no moral feelings; it is not
pushed toward crisis; its attitude to violence is utmost indifference. Contrary
to the human agent, it perceives the
outbreak of violence as a nonevent, no
big deal, and it is not prone to intensify
or to extenuate the mimetic dynamics.
A sheer view of the robot's tranquility
while the agent's mind is gradually
swept away by the blurred identity of
his double will lock the agent inescapably. Hence, the persistence of the
uncanny valley: even a prolonged interaction between a human agent and a
humanoid robot will not unmake the
robot's monstrosity. Instead, the human
agent will likely be gradually driven to
self-destruction through continuous
emotional impact without a possibility
of solution. This shows why robots
without moral sense or emotional aver-

sion to violence are particularly dangerous partners for humans.
That the uncanny valley populated
with monsters is no welcome place fits
well with the existing tendency in
robotics to avoid it. Greek heroes did
not voluntarily seek an encounter with
the Sirens; the sailors who accompanied
Odysseus put wax in their ears much as
modern researchers deliberately design
robots away from perfect human likeness. Odysseus himself, the only one
who had the courage to hear the song of
the Sirens, still needed to be attached to
the mast of his ship to navigate past the
danger unscathed. A mast strong
enough to cross the uncanny valley is
yet to be found-and Girard's theory
shows why its very existence is in doubt.
From the vantage point of Girard's
theory, humans perceive humanoid
robots in the same way as they perceive
other humans: both are agents who imitate other agents (Figure 1). The phrase
"This is a robot!" is not explanatory
because it misses this important indistinction. As with humans, the mimetic
interaction in the case of robots may go
in both directions. As Mori reports [7],
people who interact with humanoid
robots will spontaneously assume the
style of speech or movement of these
robots. Somewhat shockingly, humans
imitate robots even if they know that a
robot is a robot. This peculiar situation
also has a precedent in history.
Augustine of Hippo was the most
influential monster theorist in the first
millennium CE. Apart from reinstating,
albeit with some modifications, the
Aristotelian position that parenthood is
the main criterion of humanity even if
the child's semblance is unusual, Augustine proposed a curious argument to be
found nowhere in Aristotle's work: "If
we were not aware that apes, and monkeys, and sphinxes are not men, but
beasts, those historians [who wrote
about monsters] would possibly
describe them [various monstrous
races] as races of men" [8]. Augustine
makes this claim in the midst of a discussion of pygmies, cynocephali, and

MARCH 2015

IEEE ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION MAGAZINE

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