IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - March 2018 - 17

reasonably secure countermeasure
that could be commercially deployed [9].
As far as we know, there is no
commercial anti-spoofing GPS system available in the market.

As far as we know, there is no
commercial anti-jamming/spoofing
ultrasonic sensor available in the
market.

solution provided by manufacturers.
We should immediately prepare for
this key fob clone problem.

MMW Radar Attacking

Camera Sensor Attacking
Petit et al. have tested a camera
sensor (MobilEye C2-270) by blinding the camera with laser and LED
matrix. The attacks confused the
auto controls [11]. For the MobilEye
C2-270, a simple laser pointer was
sufficient to blind the camera and prevent detection of
vehicle ahead [11].
As far as we know, there
is no commercial anti-blinding camera sensor available
The
in the market.

Burakova et al. have found that
the SAE J1939 Standard with Bluetooth, cellular, and WiFi through telematics service used for trucks can
allow easy access for safety-critical
attacks [13]. In other words, an adversary with network access can control

Millimeter wave (MMW) radar uses
the following frequency bands: 24.0-
24.25 GHz, 76-77 GHz, 77-81 GHz,
and a UWB band of 21.65-26.65 GHz.
The 76.5 GHz band is exclusively for
automotive radar worldwide. There
are jamming and spoofing attacks
against MMW radars. MMW radar
jamming and spoofing attacks were
demonstrated in Defcon24 in 2016
[10]. Using off-the-shelf hardware,
they were able to perform jamming
and spoofing attacks, which caused
blinding and malfunction of the
Tesla, which could potentially lead to
crashes and impair the safety of selfdriving cars [10].
As far as we know, there is no
commercial anti-jamming / spoofing
MMW radar available in the market.

open source hardware/

software movement has been

Vehicle Access
Attacking
Key Fob Clone

navigating in a good direction
to remove all black boxes and

to enhance security and
In order to gain access to
a vehicle, a key fob clone
incremental innovations.
technique can be used. Two
distinct vulnerabilities were
reported in the existing keyless entry system that could affect
safety critical systems of heavy vehi100 million vehicles [12]. Affected
cles using the SAE J1939 protocol.
vehicle keyless entry systems inTesla has talked publicly about
cluded VW group remote control,
implementing a co-designing feature
Alfa Romeo, Chevrolet, Peugeot, Lanwhere only a trusted code signed
cia, Opel, Renault, Ford, and others
with a certain cryptographic key
[12]. By eavesdropping a single sigworks [14]. Cars' internal networks
nal sent by the original remote, an
will need better internal segmentaadversary is able to clone a remote
tion and authentication, so that criticontrol and gain unauthorized access
cal components don't blindly follow
to a vehicle [12]. A correlation-based
commands from the OBD2 port [14].
attack on Hitag2 allows us to clone
They need intrusion detection systhe remote control within a few
tems that can alert the driver - or
minutes using a laptop computer
rider - when something anomalous
[12]. The wireless carrier frequency
happens on the cars' internal netis currently 315 MHz in the U.S./
works [14].
Japan and 433.92 MHz (ISM band) in
All of these security problems
Europe. In Japan the modulation is
arise because vehicle designers are
frequency-shift keying (FSK), but
not expert enough in network secuin most other parts of the world,
rity. They have not paid attention
amplitude-shift keying (ASK) is used.
to the security problem. We must
Since the publication of a key fob
embed security protection to guard
clone paper [12], there has been no
against a variety of attacks.

LiDAR Sensor Attacking
Petit et al. have demonstrated effectiveness of relay attacks and spoofing attack on LiDAR (ibeo LUX 3),
respectively [11]. A cheap transceiver was able to inject fake objects
that are successfully detected and
tracked by the ibeo LUX 3. These
attacks prove that additional techniques are needed to make the
sensor more robust to ensure appropriate sensor data quality [11]
However, combining multiple
wavelength LiDAR makes it harder
for the attacker to attack both signals at the same time [11].

Ultrasonic Sensor Attacking
Liu et al. have tested Tesla, Audi,
Volkswagen, and Ford using ultrasonic sensor attacks: jamming and
spoofing attacks. They showed that
all tested vehicles were able to be
jammed and spoofed [10].
march 2018

Telematics Service Attacking

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IEEE Technology and Society Magazine

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - March 2018