IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - March 2018 - 9

in blood and treasure should make
leaders who must answer to their
citizenry wary of military adventurism. When, thanks to drone use, soldiers rarely come home in body bags,
members of the public are not often
prompted to care about or even
notice military activity half a world
away, even if it is ostensibly carried
out in their name. Meanwhile, voting
against counter-terrorism measures
exposes legislators to blame if a terrorist attack happens, but if attacks
fail to happen they are rarely in a
position to take credit. Thus, neither
the public at large nor their elected
representatives have much incentive to rein in drone use. Things are
no better in the case of the judicial
branch, as cases brought against the
government after a drone strike has
already taken place are unlikely to
succeed given the deference courts
have traditionally given to national
security concerns. Pre-approving
strikes would also be problematic.
Careful legal deliberations do not
mesh well with targeted killings
where the window of opportunity to
make the attack may be open for
only a few minutes. Special drone
courts to pre-approve strikes, modeled on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) courts, are another
possibility, but these run the risk of
becoming little more than a rubber
stamp. (Courts approve virtually all
FISA requests.)
The most tightly-argued section
of the book concerns international law.
One key issue is whether, under the
United Nations Charter, U.S. commitments specifying when a recourse
to military force is justified (jus ad bellum) are consistent with conducting
targeted killings in places where the
U.S. is not officially at war. Attempts
to justify targeted killings under international law revolve around the idea
that they constitute anticipatory selfdefense against an imminent threat of
terrorist attacks. The AUMF provides
March 2018

some additional support, serving as
gets in the first place. Even if, as the
an analogue to a declaration of war
authors note, more precise strikes
against terrorist groups. The authors
are preferable to indiscriminate strareject this line of argument pointing
tegic bombing, that still does not
out, first of all, that terrorist groups
in itself mean the more narrowlylike Al-Qaeda are non-state actors,
targeted strikes are zeroing in on a
and hence not the sort of entities
target they are justified in hitting.
upon which international law sancThe other aspect of jus in bello is
tions wage war. Second, even in
"proportionality": whether expected
the case of state-sponsored terror
military gains are excessive in light
groups, the U.S. would still need to
of incidental but foreseeable harm to
be continuously at war with the sponcivilians that may result. The authors
sor to justify military action. Finally,
helpfully frame their discussion here
very few actions against terrorists
by looking at the question of whether
can plausibly be described
as anticipatory self-defense
against an imminent threat.
The second main question is whether drone use
When thanks to drone use
violates the international
laws of war concerning the
soldiers rarely come home in
conduct of war once initiated
body bags, members of the public
(jus in bello). The two key
principles here are distincare not often prompted to care
tion and proportionality.
"Distinction" is a matter of
about or even notice military
distinguishing between civilactivity half a world away.
ians and military combatants. The signal advantage
of drones from the U.S. point
of view is that, unlike the indiscrimitargeted killings are, in the long
nate destruction wreaked by strarun, strategically useful in combattegic bombing or artillery barrages,
ting terrorism. The goal of counterdrones are technically capable of
insurgency operations is ultimately
targeting even a single individual with
to win hearts and minds. As we saw in
a fair degree of precision, thus helpVietnam, body counts are not a good
ing to avoid civilian casualties. The
metric for this. Furthermore, the very
authors argue forcefully, though,
effort to minimize U.S. casualties by
that there is a vast gulf between
using drones instead of putting troops
this technical capacity and actuin harm's way may cause the U.S.
ally choosing legitimate targets. It
to lose touch with civilian populais the nature of asymmetrical wartions and be seen as an oppressive
fare that potential targets are not
occupier rather than a potential
always actively engaged in warlike
partner in rooting out militants. Thus,
acts, which in any case exist along
while targeted killings are undenia continuum from minimal involveably effective tactically, the authors
ment (passing information to miliargue, it is likely that they are worse
tants, say) to wearing a combatant's
than useless strategically.
uniform and firing on U.S. troops.
As the authors themselves occaNo amount of precision shooting
sionally note, many of the issues they
can take the place of human judgraise about domestic politics and
ment in selecting legitimate tarinternational law are not uniquely
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Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - March 2018