IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - September 2021 - 86

Feature
These works demonstrate that it is possible to conduct
and publish unclassified research involving
intelligence communities (as an insider or an outsider)
from both scholarly and critical perspectives.
Some also might assume that one needs a security
clearance to do this type of work, but a security
clearance is not necessarily required. Since 2014, I
have studied the development of AI/big data technologies
by the Laboratory for Analytic Sciences (LAS),
which is an IC-funded research laboratory. I was supported
by the LAS to conduct unclassified studies of
a series of big data/AI technologies being developed
at the lab; in doing so, I worked closely alongside
several intelligence analysts and technical developers
from the NSA and other intelligence agencies. All
of this work was unclassified. I never held a security
clearance nor worked in classified spaces for this
research. I conducted ethnographic interviews with
LAS technology developers, analysts, and officials
(many of whom work for the NSA and other intelligence
agencies) to better understand the origin stories
of these technologies, and how user preferences
and concerns were considered in the tech design
process. This work has resulted in several publications
[34]-[39], illustrating how it is possible to do
productive scholarly research in collaboration with
members of the U.S. IC without having to obtain a
security clearance or work in a secured facility. This
published work, however, did have to go through
a review and clearance process by the laboratory
before it was submitted for peer review or published.
In my case, this review process typically only took
a few days or weeks (depending on the complexity
and length of the item under review), and it did not
significantly delay or hinder publishing of the study's
results. The reviewers were also fair in not redacting
information that, although perhaps critical, was not
of a classified nature. It should be noted, however,
that I was a tenured professor when I undertook this
work and had other concurrent research projects,
and so it was less problematic to me for the review
process to have taken a significantly long period of
time. The issue of the time required for review and
clearance, or of potential censorship, by intelligence
reviewers might be more of a concern for a graduate
student or untenured faculty member who might
have to rely on timely publications [40]. So, in terms
of publication, it is important to consider where one
is in the academic pipeline.
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In other research I have conducted on intelligence
practitioners involved in biological weapons
assessments, I have had to rely on known and
trusted policy colleagues to make the introductions
to intelligence analysts and officials. I then used
these connections to develop my own professional
relationships with these individuals to build enough
trust that they would be willing to be interviewed or
be involved in focus-group discussions, which can
also take time. In other cases, I simply cold-called
former intelligence practitioners-often those who
already had a media presence and were comfortable
talking with journalists and scholars-for interviews.
In other cases, I held workshops with intelligence
practitioners using Chatham House rules that helped
to establish the baseline for discussion. Thus, there
are a variety of approaches that can be used for
conducting unclassified research on the U.S. IC in
ways that allow access to intelligence practitioners
and that enable trust and generate new knowledge
[41]-[48].
In addition, one could go the route of working
within the IC and doing this type of research with
a security clearance; many universities have classified
entities on their campuses where such research
could occur. This approach would give one closer
access to working-level analysts to be able to probe
how new technologies enter the intelligence workspace
and are used. However, once one is working
in classified spaces and has access to classified information,
this increases the level of review needed to
release information into the public domain. In some
cases, it may not be possible to have the research
findings released publicly-or it might mean that
one has to accept significant redaction of information
for public release. Having a clearance may also
mean that any work on current and future intelligence-related
matters, whether it was connected to
the original classified research or not, would need
to be reviewed and cleared by intelligence officials.
Because the currency in academia is publications,
one would need to think carefully about whether
the benefits would outweigh the costs of obtaining a
security clearance and working in a classified environment.
In addition, there are individuals within
academia who consider any type of engagement
with the IC to be abhorrent because of historical
examples of associations between intelligence entities
and state control, and how academics have been
co-opted to further intelligence institutional aims in
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