IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - Summer 2013 - 20

but somewho, as a listening, understanding human being.
Second, what is said is not
designed to dispassionately bring
the issue under consideration
forward with irrefutable arguments. rather, the very element
of rhetorical speaking is passion
or pa q/ oj, and the speech has to
be composed of rhetorical syllogisms, e )nqumh /mata, i.e., arguments and forms of demonstration
that "slip into the heart and soul"
(qumo /j), engendering trust and
bringing about a change of mood
in the audience. This presupposes
that the other upon which the
power of rhetoric works is not only
an understanding human being,
but a mooded human being who is
open to the world by way of attunement with it. The speaker cannot
work on the listener like a block
of wood that can be manipulated
ontically this way and that with
his tools, but rather, the entire rhetorical happening takes place in
the ontological dimension and is
only possible because both speaker
and listener "inhabit" and share
the open dimension of a )lh q/ eia
within which both understanding
and attunement are enabled. The
rhetorical situation is a first-andsecond person situation, whereas
the productive situation of metaphysical power is a first-and-third
person situation. Insofar as the art
of rhetoric attempts to manipulate
the vagaries of mooded human
being, it has to be characterized
as a du /namij a neu
)/
lo /gou, a
power without the guidance of
fore-seeing logos. Of course, this
phenomenological truth does not
prevent metaphysical thinking
from misconceptualizing human
beings themselves as certain kinds
of things to be manipulated by
employing the ubiquitous ontic
schema of cause and effect. Nor are
techniques of audience manipulation in the broadest sense that
employ the schema of cause and
effect by any means ineffective; cf.
e.g. election campaigns.
20

Third, the first two peculiarities
of rhetoric as an art mean that it
is not precalculable like the usual
productive arts. The other, listening human being is his or her own
ar) xh /. Not only the speaker is an
ar) xh / in which the power of rhetoric resides and from whom it emanates in the attempt to win over a
listener, but the listener is also an
ar) xh /, here understood as his or
her own individual source of understanding and being attuned with the
world. The listening other as a free
ar) xh / is free to go along with the
speaker's presentation or not. The
listener can refuse the speaker's
attempts at persuasion and remain
mistrustful or unconvinced. This
makes rhetoric into an uncertain,
incalculable art whose means may
or may not hit the target. For this
reason, as I have already mentioned, Plato characterizes rhetoric as a mere habitude which does
not know, but merely guesses,
hoping to hit the target (Gorgias
464c). That speaking to others in
the attempt to win them over and
persuade them is ontologically an
uncertain enterprise, and in truth a
play, means in particular that this
phenomenon and technique falls
outside the ambit of those arts that
for Heidegger will develop through
Western history into modern technology with its total, planning precalculability. This indicates that the
other human being as a free other
and individual site of truth eludes
the foreknowing, calculating reach
of technological machination. The
importance of this cannot be overestimated, for it is the Achilles'
heel in Heidegger's thinking on
technology.
Fourth, Aristotle introduces
an innovation in the treatment of
rhetoric by treating not only what
is to be said to compose a successful, persuasive speech, but also
how it is to be said, the le c/ ij or
"delivery" of the speech. This is
not merely a matter of arranging
the parts of the speech stylistically
but of what he calls u (po /krisij

(C1403b22), literally "hypocrisy,"
which he even claims to have "the
greatest power" (C1403b21). This
is an astounding statement, considering what is normally understood by rhetoric and oratory. But
what is "hypocrisy" thought in the
Greek way? It is the art of playacting, of presenting oneself as
somewho to others, of projecting
one's image of oneself. This Aristotelean insight goes to the heart of
the matter, for now we can see that
the rhetorical situation in which
someone is attempting to win
over another is not only a two-way
exchange between human beings
rather than a one-way set-up in
which one human being effects a
change in another, but also crucially and essentially a situation
for showing off to another who one
is in an interplay of play-acting.
Not only is this aspect of presenting oneself as who one is - or
pretending to be who one is not -
unavoidable in a rhetorical situation, but it is the "greatest power"
in such a situation, as we know
from the media and advertising
in which images are continually
being projected. That is, showing off as somewho is the greatest means of winning over and
engendering trust in the listening
other. Compared to the who-acting
of a self-presentation, the rhetorical arguments themselves are of
secondary importance. Today we
often hear references to the "body
language" or the "charisma" of a
speaker as "factors" in the speaker's ability to influence people,
but this is a very insipid aftertaste of Aristotle's truly speculative insight into the importance of
being somewho.
The happening of truth in speaking with one another is therefore
not merely a matter of things being
shown to be (apparently) what they
are in the medium of language, but
above all of the self-showing of the
speaker as who he or she is, or pretends to be, to another. Today we
think of hypocrisy only morally as

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