IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - Summer 2014 - 67

mechanisms are clearly observable by the surveillance subject,
and that the individual, while passing through the surveillance arena,
will not be subject to more intense
scrutiny or attempted identification unless they draw attention to
themselves through their aberrant
behavior or deliberate publicityseeking, then the individual has
no more grounds for moral objection to such surveillance than they
would to being casually observed
by another commuter coincidentally passing through the same public space.
But such camera surveillance
will not be momentary if the images
are recorded either for routine analysis or for reactive analysis prompted
by some trigger event. The purpose
may be to identify persons passing through a public space, for
instance if camera surveillance is
linked to Automatic Number-Plate
recognition software and a vehicle
registration database or to facial
recognition software and a nominal
database.5 In these circumstances
Von Hirsch's three-part test is failed
at the first hurdle.

Moral Significance of
Image Use
The moral significance of the use to
which images of individuals are put
rests upon the extent to which the
image subject has control over use
of an image and information derived
from it. Where the subject has little
or no control (no opportunity to correct or contextualize the image-based
information for instance), then the
moral justification relied upon by
the image-user must be sufficient to
override the basic presumption that
individuals have a moral right to control such information as an exercise
of their autonomy.
Where disadvantage is caused
to the image-subject, then the
5

Such monitoring can identify persons excluded
from the entitlement to be at large in a given public place through a court-imposed movement restriction for instance.

image-taking (or recording) and the
use made of the image (or recording) each are independently morally
objectionable on the basis that no
one should suffer deliberate disadvantage at the hands of another: a
moral harm additional to the intrusion of privacy and infringement of
autonomy.
Weightier moral issues can override such objections. For example,
image-taking as part of a police
investigation may produce information leading to the arrest, prosecution,
conviction, and punishment of the
surveillance subject. These disadvantages to the suspected individual are
outweighed by community interests
in securing safety through an effective criminal justice system. Such
image-taking can therefore be justified within the moral theory of policing proposed by Miller and Blackler
[4]. Community interests in an effective criminal justice system also
justify, from a non-authority perspective, citizens taking non-consensual
images of police officers committing
wrongdoing such as using unwarranted and excessive force, if such
sousveillance was intended to be
used as a means of holding that officer properly to account for the excessive force.
Other circumstances are intuitively immoral and beyond justification. Where images are taken for
blackmail purposes, then the advantage to the image-taker has no moral
standing that outweighs the moral
harm of the disadvantage to the
image subject. Indeed, the immorality of the purpose compounds the
disadvantage and the moral harm.
The fact that the image subject, in
acquiescing to the blackmail and
meeting the demands, regains control over the images does not negate
the original moral wrong. Such circumstances are not an exercise of
full autonomy because the subject
is under coercion and there is no
choice of meaningful options available to the subject.
Between these two extremes
lie scenarios less clear cut. For

IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE

SuMMEr 2014

example, where there is no active
and specific investigation in progress, are police nevertheless entitled
to take images as part of their general peace-preservation function
(perhaps in lieu of, or to maximize
efficient use of, patrolling police
officers)? In such circumstances
police as image-takers would be
looking for aberrant behavior, a
departure from normal patterns
that warrants further scrutiny. Continuous scanning of a population
passing through a public space can
constitute casual observation. The
composition of the scanned population changes as different individuals enter and depart the surveillance
arena. If no information is recorded
about such individuals, this monitoring observation to detect aberrant
behavior equates to casual observation, albeit that it is still observation
conducted for a purpose. If, on the
other hand, such image-taking is
retained for any period in order to
distinguish the aberrant from the
normal (retrospectively if necessary) then this is more than casual
observation. Information is being
stored and used.
Is the observer truly observable
in such circumstances? CCTV cameras can be unobtrusive in design
and location: discreet if not actually covert. Signage advertising the
presence of CCTV may lack information about who is monitoring the
images and whether the images are
being recorded. And like the smallprint in a contract, signs may meet
regulatory requirements without
being attention-catching: just so
much street wallpaper.
If no aberrant behavior is observed
demanding immediate investigation,
justification for retaining the images
weakens and retention begins to look
like the abuse of power. Privacy and
the entitlement to be anonymous in
public seem more substantial claims
in such circumstances than the moral
theory of policing. In the absence
of an incident requiring specific
recourse to coercive or otherwise
morally harmful action, relying on
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Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - Summer 2014