Modern Age - Fall 2014 - 50

MODERN AGE

of itself. The bitterest enemies have always
found ways of communicating when the will
to do so has been stimulated by the existence
of messages that one side wants to send and
the other is disposed to receive. Absent these
factors, the diplomatic process is what Fred
Ikle's masterly text How Nations Negotiate
calls "negotiating for side effects," such as
affecting third parties, gaining time or intel-
ligence, or deception.
For the message to be worthy of attention,
the recipient must believe that it is true.
Hence, contrary to popular perception, lies,
dissembling, and deception of any kind have
short legs. Once upon a time, schools of for-
eign service used to stress the importance of
precise, unambiguous language and of cul-
tivating a reputation for accuracy and reli-
ability in communications, in admonitions
and promises, but especially in agreements.
The Roman principle "pacta sunt servanda"
(agreements are to be honored) is the only
real basis of international law. In addition,
it is fundamental to orderly international
intercourse.
In recent decades, impelled by the desire to
appear to be solving difficult problems and,
especially, under the influence of Henry Kiss-
inger, U.S. diplomats have used imprecision
deliberately-"creative ambiguity" it's called.
Vague language that each side interprets dif-
ferently has led to pretend agreements such as
the so-called Paris Accords of 1973-a thin
veil for U.S. surrender in Vietnam-and
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which
the United States promised (but not really)
to protect Ukraine's territorial integrity in
exchange for Ukraine's delivery of its nuclear
arsenal to Russia. It has also led to "peace
processes" that are thin cover for failing to
deal forthrightly with war.
In short, diplomacy worthy of the name
is the verbal representation of a compelling
reality. The diplomat must be ever aware that
50

FALL 2014

if the person across the table is worthy of his
job, he will constantly be asking why he
should be paying attention to what is being
asked of him, implicitly or explicitly. Hence
good diplomacy is all about solvency-an
excess of power over the requests made on
the basis thereof-it is about making offers
that the other side finds advantageous to
accept and impossible to refuse, especially
given the consequences of refusal. It is about
gravitas.

T

he giving of economic advantages and
the imposition of economic penalties
is a tool of statecraft both blunt and uncer-
tain. While total economic embargoes and
blockades are tools of war as deadly as atom
bombs, ordinary "economic sanctions" do
not cause states to abandon vital interests;
and although it is easy enough to buy the
favors of foreigners, it is impossible to com-
pel the performance of favors thus bought.
That is because the people who matter most
in this world value power, prestige, and life
itself more than they do wealth. They know
that money does not make power, but rather
that power means access to wealth.
President Lyndon Johnson believed he
could entice North Vietnam's dictator, Ho
Chi Minh, to desist from trying to conquer
South Vietnam by offering him a "Mekong
Valley Development Project" that would
enrich the North. "Uncle Ho won't be able
to resist this," said Johnson. But because
Ho understood that Johnson made the offer
because he did not have it in him to muster
the military means to defeat the conquest, he
was encouraged to fight and win.
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill
Clinton thought that imposing limitations
on Iraq's Saddam Hussein's capacity to sell
oil on the world market would "keep him in a
box." But Saddam, and the rest of the world,
grasped that the Americans had imposed the
Modern Age - Fall 2014

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