Modern Age - Summer 2014 - 41

BEYOND NIHILISM

Warfare, in other words, contributes to fitness, as do ethnocentrism, dominance, and
egoism: in each case, traits develop (thanks
to genetic mutations) that enhance the
abilities of some groups and individuals to
survive and even flourish in a hostile natural
environment.
As a by-product of biological necessity, war
is thus "part of the fabric of international
conflict."29 This does not mean that human
action has no bearing on the course of armed
conflict: Thayer apparently agrees with those
who believe that culture deflects natural
necessity, at least to some extent. "While the
origin of warfare is informed by evolutionary theory," Thayer writes, "warfare itself has
multiple forms and is greatly influenced by
the culture and the international system."
Appealing to culture has the effect of weakening the force of biological determinism
and allowing for a measure of historical
indeterminacy. By weaving cultural factors
into the forces of natural necessity, Thayer is
attempting to soften the traditional criticism
of sociobiology: that the biologically necessary is the morally right. On the one hand,
then, and like Aron, Thayer seems to be
reluctant to insist that war is a necessary and
ineradicable feature of international politics:
states and the international system, he concedes, may work in tandem to suppress conflict and have historically been able to do so.
On the other hand, however, Thayer argues
that given their historical contribution to
evolutionary fitness, xenophobia, war, and
ethnocentrism "are likely to be recurring
phenomena."30 The same may be said about
the urge to dominate and control. "A state's
elites," Thayer argues, "the captains of industry and media, and military and political
leaders . . . are more likely than average to
show [dominance] traits in abundance since
most leaders rise to the top of their respective hierarchies through a very competitive

process." Biology, then, although "not destiny," is in fact "good probability."31 Thayer
is thus apparently satisfied to carve out a
comparatively small niche for freedom and
contingency, at least one not big enough to
override or neutralize the forces of natural
necessity.
Thanks to Darwinian naturalism, offensive
realism's core principle-that states not only
pursue power but seek to maximize it-now
has scientific warrant. Human evolution is
responsible for exactly the sort of behavior
expected by the offensive realist; the anarchical system of states only exacerbates the
sense of insecurity that has been bred into
human beings since the late Pliocene era. The
theoretical point of all this is to strengthen
offensive realism by grounding it in science.
When Mearsheimer declares that "genuine
peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely," we now know
scientifically why that is the case.32 Indeed,
so predictable are the patterns of human
behavior and so unlikely it is that peace will
emerge from them that Mearsheimer compares the international system to an "iron
cage," a metaphor that is surely intended to
warn the neo-Kantians among us that their
efforts on behalf of a peaceful and progressive world order will almost certainly be in
vain.
These are not ivory-tower abstractions for
Thayer; in fact, these principles have significant implications for foreign policy. Thayer's
proposal for an American China policy
provides us with an interesting case in point.
Thayer argues that the United States will
soon regard China as a threat to its dominant
position in the world, just as the Chinese will
inevitably see the U.S. as the major obstacle
to its "assumption of hegemony." Because
the "struggle for hegemony is ancient and
unending," the U.S. must brace itself for
conflict. Accordingly, Thayer ranks a series
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Modern Age - Summer 2014

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