MODERN AGE FALL 2015 case was relevant because it exemplified a "universal law" that is neither historically nor ethnically specific. Jefferson's view of the common law assumed a similar correspondence between history and philosophy. Jefferson preferred common law to feudal statute not just because it was older but also because it reflected more fully the nonhistorical rights of man. In an 1812 letter, Jefferson rejected "the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favorite in the first moment of rallying to our rights against Great Britain. But it was of men who felt their rights before they had thought of their explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men; of expatriated men."3 Again, Jefferson bases the authority of historical example on philosophical truth. The colonists were aware of their rights because they were lucky enough to be descendants of the Saxons-but their rights themselves did not rest on this inheritance. Jefferson also suggests a distinction between different phases of the Founding. His remark indicates that arguments about German liberty were important in motivating the Declaration and the original state constitutions but were later superseded by other ideas. This indication could be supported by a remark from Federalist No. 1. According to Publius, the debate over ratification was an opportunity "to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." Whatever the framers learned from history, the authority of the Constitution comes from rational will instead of ancestry. It is finally worth noting that Jefferson's philosophical conception of liberty made him remarkably hostile to historical argu30