THE MARSHALL PLAN French businessmen. Romantic dreams of a classless society and anti-Americanism persuaded some French men and women even when their bellies were full.21 In this battle for hearts and minds, however, General Marshall's and Western democracies' credible commitment to basic human freedoms undoubtedly found traction with large numbers of French citizens skeptical of the blandishments-and pervasive propaganda-of both sides. Frustrated with the Moscow conference's lack of progress, Marshall met directly with Joseph Stalin on April 15. He told the Soviet leader that he was "very concerned and somewhat depressed at the extent and depth of misunderstandings and differences" revealed in these meetings.22 What was Stalin's reply? According to notes made at the time, the Soviet dictator remarked that he did not think the situation was so tragic, and he was more optimistic than General Marshall. After all, these were only the first skirmishes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Stalin said that the Russians would be frank and open in their dealings and that they considered it impermissible to turn the problem of Germany into any sort of game. Secretary Marshall politely replied that he was encouraged by Stalin's concluding remarks.23 But Marshall was not at all encouraged by the core meaning of Stalin's anodyne response. After returning home, the secretary of state spoke to the American people in a radio address on April 28: "Agreement was made impossible," Marshall explained, "because . . . the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government"-political adaptations that would have made it easy for a power to seize "absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically . . . and . . . mortgaged to turn over a large moder nagejour nal .com 21http://www.modernagejournal.com