NFPA Journal - May/June 2017 - 65

Learning Lessons
10 TAKEAWAYS FROM THE RESPONSE
TO THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING
What happened in Boston in 2013 can happen anywhere. The following are 10 takeaways extrapolated
from analyses of the public safety response to the Boston Marathon bombing.

1. While crises by their very nature are unpredictable, first
responders should plan, rehearse scenarios, conduct exercises,
and provide leadership training for personnel. Kurt Schwartz,
director of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency,
said this involves bringing together local, regional, state, and federal representatives. "It's not enough to just have a good plan,"
he said. "You have to exercise the plan."

2. "Fixed" or planned events can be effective platforms for
practicing incident management, even without an emergency.
Events like a football game or county fair can stand in for more
serious events. Tabletop exercises can also provide experience
and insight.

3. Authorities with jurisdiction, including law enforcement, fire,
emergency medical personnel, hospitals, and both appointed
and elected officials should establish ongoing personal familiarity with each other. This could take the form of regular meetings
or breakfasts or participation in exercises that allow for personal
connections and cooperation. Having each other's cell phone
numbers is a small but crucial step.
4. Second- or even third-in-command officials should be prepared to step up in a crisis to free senior command to focus on
strategic decisions. No matter how hands-on a senior commander is, he or she must be prepared to cede operational decisions
to less senior personnel. "Senior leaders have to prepare the
second echelon of leaders to step forward to take responsibility
for running those operations," said Arnold M. Howitt of Harvard
University, coauthor of a report analyzing the response to the
bombing.
5. In an ongoing crisis, senior command should also not be
"unduly exposed" to the enormous flow of raw information, "lest
their attention be diverted from strategic issues and problems,"
as an analysis of the bombing by Harvard put it. Rumors, innuendo, and unverified reports-often rampant during an incident-
should be vetted as much as possible before being brought to
the attention of senior command.

GETT Y IMAGES

6. Policies and procedures about the use of social media and
channels for providing information to local reporters should be
established before a crises strikes, and a joint information center
should be set up during an incident. Be aware that social media "is
not just a notification process, but it's a dialogue you enter into with
people and you have to be prepared to answer their questions," said
former Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis. Nor, he says, is the
use of social media an excuse to avoid briefing the press regularly.
The task of running a press conference may best be relegated to
elected officials who are briefed by first responders.

7. In an extended event, senior management should be aware
that fatigue and stress can impact personnel, even when they
themselves insist on staying on the job. After more than 48 hours
on duty, certain personnel should be relieved for eight hours
for rest before they return to duty. "At the end of five days there
were people who were literally fainting from overwork," Davis
said. "We can work for 24 or 36 hours. That happens frequently."
But when personnel work nonstop for 48 to 72 hours, it's time to
relieve people and rely on partners, he said. Or as one official put
it, "Send half the people home and order a lot of pizza."

8. Normal communication methods like cell phones and portable radios may be inoperable when systems are overloaded. In a
prolonged event, batteries can run out. Preparation can include
alternative communication systems and having extra batteries
close by. While Boston's first responders had a reliable radio
system, "we were not effectively prepared for the loss of cell
phones," Schwartz said. "We had not spent time thinking about
how important cell phones were."

9. Self-deployment by police, fire, or other emergency personnel
from outlying communities may be helpful to supplement local
responses, but protocols should be established to coordinate
those who race to the scene. Chains of command must be established and maintained; self-deployers should know to seek out
those in charge. This issue and a lack of weapons discipline when
attempting to apprehend the remaining suspect in Watertown
were key areas in which the Boston response has been criticized.
10. All preparation should consider "worst-case scenarios,"
including mass casualties. No one can plan for every contingency, and incident command system training does not necessarily
teach leadership "outside the box," Schwartz said-but that's
exactly what some scenarios may require. -S.S.

N F PA . O R G / J O U R N A L * NFPA JOURNAL

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Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of NFPA Journal - May/June 2017