NFPA Journal - Fall 2021 - 68

A 'Splendid
and Terrible
Sight'
'POSSIBLE, PERHAPS INEVITABLE'
Understanding Boston's 1872 conflagration using
the NFPA Fire & Life Safety Ecosystem
 'THIS FIRE WILL GO TO THE WATER': A depiction of the devastation in the aftermath of the fire, from Frank Leslie's Weekly.
THE EXACT IGNITION OF THE GREAT BOSTON FIRE of 1872
remains a mystery. Even if we knew the genesis of the original
spark, however, it would be difficult to explain why this conflagration
reached such epic proportions. But we know enough
about the fire and the conditions surrounding it that when we
consider it through the lens of the NFPA Fire & Life Safety Ecosystem™
that
human-pulled engines were up to 10 minutes slower than
horse-drawn engines. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic revealed
flaws in our health system, the horse epizootic underscored
the fragility of an equine-based transportation system.
, we can begin to explain why this massive fire was not
only possible but perhaps inevitable.
Government Responsibility / Investment in Safety
In the years before the fire, Boston Fire Chief John S. Damrell
was very clear about what the city should do to improve fire
safety. He specifically warned city officials about a lack of pressure
in aging water mains in Boston's fast-growing commercial
district; he decried the popularity of wooden Mansard roofs;
and he called for more fire houses to be located downtown. All
of his warnings, with the exception of a request for a fire boat,
were brushed aside. Even Chicago's historic 1871 blaze failed
to prod the city to action. In the Great Boston Fire, Damrell's
fears were realized: water failed to reach the tops of burning
buildings, fire spread from Mansard roof to Mansard roof, and
Boston's fire force was quickly overwhelmed. The fire boat
went into service two months after the fire.
He specifically warned city officials about
a lack of pressure in aging water mains in
Boston's fast-growing commercial district;
he decried the popularity of wooden
Mansard roofs; and he called for more
fire houses to be located downtown.
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Beginning in late September 1872, an aggressive and mysterious
influenza struck horses in nearly every major urban
center in North America, lasting nearly a year. This so-called
epizootic was not necessarily fatal, but horses became too
sick to work. Horses pulled Boston's fire engines, and Damrell
and his assistants scrambled to develop a plan to protect the
city by having men pull engines and to limit responses on first
alarms. This meant fewer engines initially responded when
Box 52 was struck in the commercial district at the outset of
the Boston fire, giving the blaze a head start. It didn't help
68 | NFPA JOURNAL * FALL 2021
Development and Use of Current Codes / Code Compliance
Damrell himself was a master builder, and among the causes
he championed was the establishment of stricter building
codes. Due in part to his advocacy, the city passed a new building
code, Chapter 280 of the Acts of 1871, which gave the city
the authority to establish a bureau of survey and inspection
of new construction. However, " the bureau had little power to
require changes in procedures or materials. Its power was of
a persuasive nature primarily, " noted scholar Diane Rudnick
observed in her thesis on the fire. Even after the Great Fire, it
took years-and more fires-before codes and standards were
brought up to what Damrell would consider an adequate level.
Tellingly, after leaving the fire service, Damrell served as Boston's
building commissioner for the next 25 years.
Skilled Workforce / Informed Public
Boston's fire service was considered one of the best in the
country. During the fire, however, civilians jumped into action
with good intentions but little knowledge. Under pressure to
" do something, " Damrell hastily gave permission for citizens
to use gunpowder to blow up buildings to create fire breaks.
This not only proved ineffective, but since gas mains could not
be shut off at the street, some of the gunpowder explosions
ignited the still-flowing gas. Damrell had to finally send out
orders that the use of gunpowder be halted on pain of arrest.
Informed Public
While Boston's citizens were vocally proud of their fire force,
many of them demonstrated a reluctance to spend extravagantly
on public works. A newspaper editorial prior to the fire
sneered at Damrell's push for more fire houses downtown,
opining: " What matter to the city of Boston whether Hose Company
No. 1 or Hose Company No. 100 should succeed in getting
a stream of water on to Mrs. Muldoon's feather bed in advance
of the other? " NIMBYism was also an issue. Patrick Donahoe,
the publisher of Boston's Catholic newspaper The Pilot, insisted
that a fire hydrant be removed from outside the publication's
fine new downtown headquarters. During the Great Fire, he
watched as the building burned to the ground. -S.S.
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

NFPA Journal - Fall 2021

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