NFPA Journal - Winter 2024 - 42

Celotex then marketed RS5000 as " the first PIR
[polyisocyanurate foam] board to successfully test
to BS 8414, " and as " acceptable for use in buildings
above 18 meters in height. " However, the test on
which Celotex relied in support of that claim had
been manipulated as we have described above, a
fact that Celotex did not disclose in its marketing
literature. Moreover, BS 8414 is a system test
and does not involve the testing or classification
of individual products. Celotex deliberately tucked
that information away in the small print of its marketing
literature.
Investment in Safety
The Phase 2 report is highly critical of
the tenant management organization,
or TMO, responsible for administering
Grenfell Tower along with a number of other
residential buildings totaling nearly 10,000 units
of public housing in the Kensington and Chelsea
areas of London. The TMO is characterized in the
report as careless and ineffectual, with little regard
for maintaining building features designed for the
safety of residents:
...There was no adequate system for ensuring that
defects identified in fire risk assessments [for
Grenfell Tower] were remedied effectively and in
good time. The TMO developed a huge backlog
of remedial work that it never managed to clear,
a situation that was aggravated by the failure of
its senior management to treat defects with the
seriousness they deserved. Indeed, on one occasion
senior management intervened to reduce
the importance attached to the implementation
of remedial measures. The demands of managing
fire safety were viewed by the TMO as an inconvenience
rather than an essential aspect of its duty
to manage its property carefully.
Certain important features of the fire prevention
measures at Grenfell Tower were not of an
appropriate standard. For example, the new front
doors installed by the TMO in 2011 and 2012 did
not meet the fire resistance standards suggested
by Approved Document B because the TMO had
failed to specify the correct fire safety standard
when ordering them.
Inspection and maintenance regimes affecting fire
prevention systems did not reflect best practice
and were inconsistently followed. Many self-closing
devices on the front doors of flats in Grenfell Tower
failed to work effectively and some were missing
entirely. The TMO did not institute an effective
inspection and maintenance program for self-closing
devices on entrance doors despite an Enforcement
Notice issued by the LFB in late 2015 relating to ineffective
door closers in another high-rise residential
42 | NFPA JOURNAL * WINTER 2024
building it managed, Adair Tower, and a Deficiency
Notice issued in 2016 in relation to Grenfell Tower
itself on the same grounds.
Skilled Workforce
The report illustrates a number of ways
that skilled workforce failures contributed
to the disaster that befell Grenfell
Tower, notably through the TMO's " ill-qualified " fire
assessor and in the form of the principal players in
the 2015-2016 refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. That
refurbishment included the selection and application
of the ACM panels that were responsible for the
fire's spread, a component that had been selected as
a cost-saving measure over the zinc cladding that
had originally been proposed:
...The TMO's only fire assessor for its entire estate,
Carl Stokes, was allowed to drift into that role without
any formal selection or procurement process.
He had misrepresented his experience and qualifications
(some of which he had invented) and was
ill-qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on
buildings of the size and complexity of Grenfell
Tower, let alone to hold the entire TMO portfolio.
As a result, there was a danger that fire risk assessments
would not meet the required standard.
NFPA Journal - Winter 2024

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of NFPA Journal - Winter 2024
