NFPA Journal - Winter 2024 - 43

One very significant reason
why Grenfell Tower came
to be clad in combustible
materials was systematic
dishonesty on the part of
those who made and sold
the rainscreen cladding
panels and insulation
products. They engaged in
deliberate and sustained
strategies to manipulate
the testing processes,
misrepresent test data, and
misled the market.
materials to be used in the external wall thought
that responsibility for their suitability and safety
lay with someone else.
...Although Mr. Stokes' methods for carrying out
fire risk assessments generally reflected the Health
and Safety Executive's five steps for managing risks,
the LGA Guide [produced by the Local Government
Association], and PAS 79, they suffered from serious
shortcomings. He often failed to check whether the
TMO had taken action in response to risks he had
identified in previous assessments. Despite the concerns
expressed by the LFB about his competence,
the TMO continued to rely uncritically on him, a
situation which made the danger more acute in the
absence of any arrangements for assessing the quality
of his work.
The choice of combustible materials for the cladding
of Grenfell Tower resulted from a series of errors
caused by the incompetence of the organizations and
individuals involved in the refurbishment. Studio E
[the architect], Rydon [the contractor], and Harley
Facades [the exterior cladding subcontractor] all
took a casual approach to contractual relations.
They did not properly understand the nature and
scope of the obligations they had undertaken, or, if
they did, paid scant attention to them. They failed
to identify their own responsibilities for important
aspects of the design and in each case assumed that
someone else was responsible for matters affecting
fire safety. Everyone involved in the choice of the
None of those involved in the design of the external
wall or the choice of materials [which also included
Exova, a fire safety consulting firm, and the Royal
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and
its public-housing building manager, the Kensington
and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization
(KCTMO)] acted in accordance with the standards
of a reasonably competent person in their position.
They were not familiar with or did not understand
the relevant provisions of the Building Regulations,
Approved Document B or industry guidance. Studio
E demonstrated a cavalier attitude to the regulations
affecting fire safety, and Rydon and Harley relied
on their previous experience rather than on any
technical analysis or expertise. The risks of using
combustible materials in the external walls of highrise
buildings were well known and they should have
been aware of them.
Preparedness and
Emergency Response
The Phase 1 report identified the urgent
need to adapt fire strategies for highrise
buildings with combustible cladding. According
to reporting by Reuters, " a 'stay-put' strategy
remained in effect for more than an hour, resulting
in dozens of lost lives. The strategy effectively
failed after just 12 minutes, when the fire spread
to other flats. However, an evacuation order was
only issued by the London Fire Brigade after 1 hour
and 39 minutes, with 61 flats affected by the flames
and 107 people still inside the building. Only 36 of
those who remained at that point made it out alive. "
The Phase 2 report noted the failure on the part of
the tenant management organization to maintain
NFPA .ORG/JOURNAL * NFPA JOURNAL | 43
Cladding is removed
for testing from a
residential tower in
England. Numerous
buildings across
the country were
found to be outfitted
with ACM panels
with combustible
polyethylene.
CHRISTOPHER FURLONG/GETTY IMAGES
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NFPA Journal - Winter 2024

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