NEWH - August 2003 - (Page 51)

lessons not learned: Life Safety issues from The Cocoanut Grove to The Station… by Jillene Cochran, Weber + Thompson In Boston’s Cocoanut Grove 492 people lost their lives and 166 people were injured when a fire ripped through the club. The flames and noxious smoke spread so swiftly throughout the building that some victims collapsed at their tables. Most panicking patrons ran to the only exit they knew, the main revolving door. This was knocked off its axis and jammed, causing over 200 victims to pile up behind it. Other patrons fled to doors that opened inward, were locked or, in one instance, was welded shut to “prevent patrons from skipping out on tabs.” Many believe that the lighting failed as well, plunging the club into darkness, causing patrons to succumb to the thick smoke when they tried to traverse the club in the dark hampered by hundreds of tables and chairs, unable to find emergency exits in the “rabbit warren” of rooms and corridors. assembly occupancy.” Providing easily identifiable exit paths – spaced so fires or collapsing structures do not easily block all exits – is critical in designing a safe facility. In general terms assembly occupancies are required to have a minimum of at least two exits with the main entrance/exit able to accommodate at least half of the occupant load. All exit doors must “swing in the direction of the path of travel,” and must be equipped with panic hardware. These doors and the paths of travel to them must have directional and exit signage identifying the location and path to each door. In addition, emergency lighting, with an independent power source – in case of building power failure – and sufficient intensity to clearly light the route of travel to each exit is required. Without these necessary precautions, there is a higher probability of more tragedies like the one in Rhode Island. Sound familiar? The Cocoanut Grove fire occurred in 1942, however many of the situations that caused that tragedy were present in the more recent fatal nightclub incident at Rhode Island’s The Station, currently the fourth most deadly nightclub fire in U.S. history. This and other incidents (namely Chicago’s E2) focused the nation’s attention on nightclub and bar safety and galvanized designers, owners and officials to carefully scrutinize current codes, building standards and operating procedures. Organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), as well as other industry and government groups across the country have been convening to discuss the following issues to prevent further disasters. Fire Protection and Smoke Control Systems Occupancy and Exiting Requirements Exceeding allowed occupant loads, insufficient or noncode complying exits or poorly delineated exit paths have been directly cited as contributing factors in at least three of the five most deadly nightclub fires in the United States (see sidebar). For example, in the Cocoanut Grove fire the occupancy limit of the club exceeded safe occupant load maximums by over 400 people. Occupant load determines the minimum number and width of required exits based on calculations of the type of assembly occupancy – buildings, structures or portions of each with an occupancy of 50 or more persons. The guidelines, developed by the NFPA and used by fire officials as a basis for their inspection programs, state, “exiting is the most critical of all requirements for any Fire protection systems – onsite or built-in equipment including portable fire extinguishers, interior standpipes and hose lines, automatic sprinkler systems and fire alarms – have become one of the first lines of defense against the loss of life. All assembly occupancies, no matter the size, are required by current fire codes to provide portable fire extinguishers and both visual and audible alarm systems. Most regulating codes require all new construction of assembly occupancies exceeding 300 occupants or any facility serving alcoholic beverages to have full sprinkler systems installed. However, as with The Station, many current bar and nightclub facilities are not required to install sprinkler systems because of their small size and age. Many facilities built before 1974 were grandfathered in under the new codes and are exempt from the sprinkler requirements. Since The Station fire however, there has been a push by the public and officials to require sprinkler systems and monitoring by local fire departments in all nightclubs and dance halls, regardless of when they were built. Although there is considerable proof that sprinklers significantly reduce the loss of life, the proposals, which could cost millions, is gaining opposition. The argument is that enacting and enforcing such regulations would put the brunt of the financial weight on the small, established club owners. Finding the funds to retrofit their facilities, while many are already struggling in the current economy, is a significant issue that is being weighed against the possibility of more lives lost. 51

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of NEWH - August 2003

NEWH - August 2003
Contents
Letter From the Editor
Hospitality News
On the Road Again
Calling All Entries
Tips on Specs
The Creation of the Ritz-Carlton Golf Resort
Signature Golf Resorts
Designing a Golf Clubhouse
International Purchasing
Creating a Vision for Clubhouse Renovations
Signage for Today’s Golf Resort
The History of Nightclubs
To See and Be Seen
Appealing to the Senses
Marysol–Real and Magical in the Windy City
The Juggling Act—The “Ooh and Aah” vs. Value Engineering
Cork—Not Just for Wine Bottles Anymore
Lessons Not Learned: Life Safety Issues From the Cocoanut
Small Business Advice...
Things to Consider When Building, Renovating or Expanding
Industry Partner Education
Sources and Credits
Bios

NEWH - August 2003