IEEE Power & Energy Magazine - May/June 2014 - 70

that affected Christchurch, new
Zealand. in addition to the aforementioned generation-level outages discussed in result of the
Fukushima #1 nuclear power
PAS
350 kW
350 kW
50 kW
250 kW
plant incident in Japan, all of these
disasters caused power outages
PV
GE
GE
MCFC
CB1
originating in failures at the transmission and distribution level. For
CB2
6.6 kV ac- Bus
example, in Chile, the longitudinal
configuration of the interconnected
system led to the formation of four
Integrated Power Supply
DVR 2
DVR 1
electrical islands when equipment
(IPS)
failed at large substations (see Figure 3) and when a few transmission
lines experienced some damage.
still, these damages were relatively
Normal
B3
B2
B1
A
dc
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
minor, and service into a single
Load
Load
Load
Load
Load
Load
transmission system was restored
within two days in the mainland.
130 kW
420 kW
18 kW
180 kW
20 kW
700 kW
more damage, although affecting a
small percentage of power grid elements, occurred in the distribution
MCFC Molten Carbonate Fuel Cells
PAS
Pole Air Switch
portion of the grid causing power
GE
Gas Engine Generator Set
CB
Circuit Breaker
outages extending up to a week.
PV
Photovoltaic Panels
DVR Dynamic Voltage Restorer
on the island of robinson Crufigure 2. A configuration of the MPQSS installed in Sendai, Japan. (Source: K. Hirose.) soe in Chile, where half of the main
grid disappeared underwater in the
aftermath
of
the
2010
earthquake
and tsunami, it is quite typical
generators (DGs): gas engine sets, fuel cells, and PV panels.
to find diesel systems in operation. when such disasters affect
the total rated capacity of the DGs was 1 mw.
after the four-year field demonstration period, the mPQss these islands, the transport of diesel to the islands by ships is
was kept in operation with some technical modifications. as impeded, thus reducing the reliability of the isolated electria result of the tohoku Fukushima disaster, a long-term power cal system. such systems offer an avenue for integrating local
outage of about two and a half days occurred, even in sendai resources and assets for electrical storage so that a reliable supCity where the mPQss had been operating. at the same time, ply of electricity can be available for critical loads. an additional
the trunk line for medium-pressure gas was undamaged, and
gas-supply services were never interrupted to the city. as a
result, gas-engine power generators, although experiencing a
momentary shut down as soon as the city lost power, could
be restarted shortly thereafter. these were used to power university hospitals and welfare facilities. Concomitantly, the
supply of heat using thermal exhaust from power generation
was available for use. additionally, the supply of high-quality
power such as dc and uninterruptible ac (quality class a and
B1) to loads continued without interruption even immediately
after power was lost to the rest of sendai. it is significant to
note the usefulness of the ntt Facilities microgrid at sendai
in the relief and recovery efforts that followed the Fukushima
#1 nuclear power plant disaster.
II) Islanding Mode

III) Outage
(Backup Mode)

600 kVA

200 kVA

I) Grid Interconnection
(Normal Mode)

Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Chile,
Japan, and New Zealand
extensive power outages followed the February 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile, the march 2011 earthquake and
tsunami in Japan, and the 2010 and 2011 series of earthquakes
70

ieee power & energy magazine

figure 3. Damage at the Charrua Substation, Chile, after
the 2010 earthquake. (Source: A. Kwasinski.)
may/june 2014

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IEEE Power & Energy Magazine - May/June 2014