ILMA Compoundings – December 2018 - 14

requirements, especially for the legacy
tests, in the name of continuous
improvement. That argument did not
carry as much weight with the oil side
as the OEMs had hoped it would.
Despite these situations, negotiations progressed almost to conclusion.
At the proverbial eleventh hour, the
OEMs asked for the introduction of
a new performance requirement: that
a bench oxidation test, the ROBO
(ASTM D7528), be performed
to qualify every commercialized
formulation. This was intended to
demonstrate that any marketed oil
would retain its low-temperature
fluidity properties despite oxidation
taking place in service. The oil side
very reluctantly agreed to this new
requirement to allow the SN category
to be introduced.
Even with all these issues, the SN
category did have enhancements over
its predecessor: Catalyst protection
was reflected in phosphorus-retention
parameters; the fuel economy requirements were agreed upon, and Sequence
VID was successfully developed; E85
compatibility was encompassed; and
ROBO testing helped ensure aged oil
cold flow.
However, lingering tensions did
call into question whether a successor
category like GF-6 could happen.
Overtures were made to four OEMs to
gauge their enthusiasm to start work on
GF-6. All four raised two critical points:
(1) The ILSAC/Oil voting structure was
unacceptable. A new process needed to
be created with a "one company, one
vote" structure, with weighting across
voting groups. (2) Engine designs will
have shorter and shorter life spans as
technologies emerge.
As a result, the "ILSAC/Oil" process
was replaced with the "Auto-Oil
Advisory Panel" (AOAP) process that
appears in the API licensing program
today. AOAP features the voting
structure requested by the OEMs, but

14

DECEMBER 2018

| COMPOUNDINGS | ILMA.ORG

its creation and adoption took almost
four years! This reflects the unfortunate mistrust that had arisen between
the various stakeholders during the
GF-5 development and negotiation
phases. None of the organizations
taking part in the creation of AOAP
wanted to allow its counterparts to
"bake" an advantage into the process.

Meanwhile ...
The Perfect Storm
As this article was being written in
September 2018, many news outlets
were pondering the decade that had
elapsed since the 2008 financial crisis.
Although it might feel like a long
time ago, 2008 was roughly midway
into GF-5 development. And GF-5
development was impacted by the loss
of large numbers of both experienced
staff and funding for research and
development (R&D) activities.
In fact, some studies suggest that the
U.S. only returned to 2007 levels of
GDP per person in 2012. It took five
years to resume pre-crisis productivity.
During much of those five years,
many companies involved in category
development trimmed back their
travel, R&D budgets and participation
in conferences. This contraction did
not help the young survivors close
their experience gap compared to
their senior counterparts who left the
industry between 2007 and 2008.
As if these industry constraints
weren't enough, they were doubled -
not only did the passenger car OEMs
issue a needs statement toward GF-6,
but they did so at essentially the same
time as the heavy-duty OEMs called for
PC-11. Both PC-11 and GF-6 initially
targeted 2014 first-license dates. Therefore, financial and staffing resources still
weakened by the crisis were now going
to be spread on two fronts.
It was actually four fronts: Both
PC-11 and GF-6 triggered "splits"
into subcategories. These subcategories

were essentially defined by viscosity
grade. The intent was to capitalize on
the fuel economy (and/or attending
emissions reductions) associated with
lower viscosity grades. But in both the
light- and heavy-duty realms, this led
to intense questioning: For example,
should these lower viscosity grades be
subjected to all the same performance
requirements as the more traditional
viscosity grades? Could they be
expected to conform to the same
limits? As of September 2018, the
metaphorical jury was still out for the
lower-viscosity oils of "GF-6B."
In time, it became five fronts as
General Motors elected to refresh its
dexosTM specifications with a 2015
implementation target. Because the GM
specs embraced many tests lying outside
those slated for inclusion in GF-6, additive companies had to ensure that they
could accommodate the requirements of
the dexosTM-specific tests before they
could be sure of GF-6 test appetites.
Ultimately, the PC-11/GF-6/dexosTM
development overlaps resolved themselves, but in an undesirable way as
delays in test development occurred
in all three realms. Those delays were
most pronounced for GF-6.

Enter GF-6 Test
Development
It is critical to understand that GF-6
was always intended to introduce
replacement tests for the legacy
Sequence IIIG, Sequence IVA,
Sequence VG and Sequence VID
tests. All of these tests were on the
verge of disappearing, as test parts
were running out. But GF-6 also
introduced two new tests intended
to mitigate field problems.
The first of these new tests (now
referred to as Sequence IX) was
intended to confer protection against
low-speed pre-ignition (LSPI) events.
LSPI is an unintended consequence
of the combustion conditions arising
http://www.ILMA.ORG
ILMA Compoundings – December 2018

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of ILMA Compoundings – December 2018
