Homeland Defense Journal - January 2009 - 37

By Michael D. Brown COUNTERPOINT Time For DHS and FEMA to Split B EFORE THE Department of Homeland Security was even a twinkle in the eye of Congress, an organization existed that was, and could have continued to be, the honest broker among the federal departments, agencies, state and local governments and non-governmental organizations that respond to natural and manmade disasters: the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). The CDRG, chaired by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, brought together all parties involved in responding to disasters. The integration of the federal government’s various response mechanisms and programs into the DHS was done for noble intentions, but the outcome was incomplete, as many assets were never fully acquired. Response programs remain scattered across the federal spectrum, from ﬁreﬁghting operations at the National Forest Service, to disaster medical teams within HHS and nuclear programs at DOE. It would have been both impracticable and politically impossible to fully integrate all federal response functions under one roof, yet the CDRG rubric allowed the programs to exist independently until such time as FEMA required their assets for disaster response. The National Response Plan spelled out this relationship in which an independent FEMA directed all of the Emergency Support Functions. FEMA harmonized the various roles of these programs by mobilizing assets and resources through mission assignments, with the understanding that FEMA would pay for those costs through the Disaster Relief Fund. In this capacity FEMA was entrusted to act without regard to ongoing bureaucratic turf and funding struggles. It coordinated the federal government’s response and incurred the costs among its partner departments and agencies, which, during normal times, competed with one another at the OMB and various authorizing and appropriations committees for resources. That natural competition disappeared when FEMA responded to disasters. Post-DHS, FEMA simply became another program within a vast bureaucracy, competing among shotgun brides and grooms for resources and dollars. This change was counterproductive. Previously, FEMA was in regular contact with its partner departments and agencies, including the FBI, the Coast Guard and NORTHCOM, by coordinating exercises and assisting with programmatic and resource decisions. Most importantly, all of these organizations recognized FEMA as the “lead” when it came to responding to disasters. Now, with FEMA subsumed into the DHS, it lacks the clout, objectivity and independence it needs to function as an honest broker. There are other additional problems as well. One is that the DHS split the two phases of disaster management, preparedness and response, by taking funds out of catastrophic disaster planning and reassigning personnel from FEMA. These actions have had serious consequences. The response of Congress to FEMA’s reduced status and capability has been mixed. On the one hand, credit needs to be given to Congress for recognizing that the emasculated FEMA budget was inadequate, and for subsequently restoring the budget for catastrophic disaster planning. It has also wisely restored personnel authorizations, and recombined the preparedness and response functions that had been split by the DHS. Recognizing the disastrous effects of these actions, Congress took the appropriate steps to correct these mistakes. However, the Congressional response has been naïve in other ways. For example, by granting FEMA a “special status” within the DHS, Congress believes that, on a day to day basis, the FEMA Administrator can sit at the table with the Secretary of As long as FEMA is Homeland Security as a within the DHS, other subordinate, and then when departments and agencies disaster strikes, quickly will always question its switch chairs and roles. It objectivity and motives. is fanciful to expect the FEMA Administrator to be arguing for resources, policies and programs at the leadership table under normal times, and then in times of crisis be called upon to be the principal decision-maker. That is an expectation that will simply not occur in reality. As long as FEMA is within the DHS, other departments and agencies will always question its objectivity and motives. That is how D.C. works and Congress knows it. There should be no question as to who’s in charge in the midst of a crisis. Only by taking FEMA out of the DHS and restoring its prior status as an independent agency will there be clear lines of leadership and command when we most need it. This is not a problem that can be solved by creating nominal bureaucratic rules; it must be true in fact as well as in principle. n Michael D. Brown, is a former Under Secretary at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Visit www.homelanddefensejournal.com Homeland Defense Journal | 35

Homeland Defense Journal - January 2009

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